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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. The appeal is from final orders and a final judgment of the 
district court. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing Appellants' (the "Hipwells") fraud 
claims on the basis of this Court's language in the prior appeal in this case, Jensen v. 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997) (attached as Appendix "A"), where the 
sufficiency of the fraud claims was not before this Court in Jensen; Jensen specifically 
confirmed the continued existence of Hipwells5 fraud claims; and Jensen held that the 
Hipwells' fraud claims would be governed by a two year statute of limitations? 
This issue was preserved below. [R. 2682-2690] This issue presents a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. State of Utah v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997). 
2. Did the district court err in refusing to allow the Hipwells leave to amend 
their complaint to include language contained in this Court's opinion in Jensen that the 
conduct of Dr. Healy could be imputed to IHC if Dr. Healy was acting as an agent or in 
privity with IHC and if Dr. Healy acted at least in part to further the interests of IHC? 
1 
This issue was preserved below. [R. 2624-2647] This issue presents a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. Fisher v. Roberts, 125 F.3d 974, 977 (6th Cir. 1977); 
City ofMonticello v. Christiansen, 788 P.2d 518 (Utah 1990). 
3. Did the district court err in refusing to permit evidence in the nature of an 
admission by conduct that defendant Dr. Healy conspired with his attorney brother and 
his co-counsel to conceal the medical negligence of Dr. Healy and IHC in the treatment 
of Shelly Hipwell ("Shelly")? This issue was preserved below. [R. 3666-3677; R. 5008 
at pp. 1229-1259; 5016 at pp. 1-18 and 24-26] This issue is reviewed on an abuse of 
discretion standard. State of Utah v. Real Property at 633 East, etc., 942 P.2d 925, 930 
(Utah 1997). 
4. Did the district court err in (a) refusing to allow the Hip wells' expert 
medical witness, a physician specializing in high-risk obstetrics, to give an opinion that 
the standard of care by Defendant IHC's emergency room was breached in its treatment 
of Shelly, a high-risk obstetrical patient who presented at Defendant IHC's emergency 
room with potentially life-threatening obstetrical symptoms and signs but was sent home 
with Tylenol; and (b) dismissing the Hipwells' allegations of negligence against 
Defendant IHC insofar as Shelly's emergency room treatment was concerned, and in 
instructing the jury that Defendant IHC's emergency room was not negligent? This issue 
2 
was preserved below. [R. 5004 at pp. 395-402, 457-459; R. 5011 at pp. 1789-1815; R. 
5014 at pp. 2348-2349] This issue is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. 
Steffensen v. Smith }s Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). However, 
to the extent the district court applied the wrong legal standard, this Court reviews for 
correctness. Chandler v. Blue Cross, 833 P.2 356, 360 (Utah 1992). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Hipwells alleged that doctors and lawyers conspired to conceal medical 
negligence and to deprive Shelly Hipwell, a brain damaged patient, of legal 
compensation for her catastrophic injuries. 
The Hipwells, who are Shelly's heirs, seek recovery in this action for the 
malpractice and fraud committed by Defendants/Appellees, Michael J. Healy, M.D. 
("Dr. Healy") and McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee"), owned by Intermountain 
Health Care Corporation ("IHC") (collectively "Defendants"), in connection with their 
pregnancy-related treatment of Shelly in December of 1988. 
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The Defendants' fraudulent conduct is at the heart of the Hipwells' case. The 
Defendants' negligence caused Shelly to become critically ill. In an attempt to conceal 
that negligence, the Defendants transferred Shelly to the University of Utah Hospital 
("University Hospital") on the basis of a condition that did not exist. In January, 1989, 
at the University Hospital, Shelly's heart was negligently punctured during a sternal bone 
marrow biopsy. This event, given Shelly's critically ill condition, resulted in severe 
anoxic brain damage and Shelly's ultimate death. 
Dr. Healy knew that he was a potential defendant in Shelly's medical negligence 
case. Two days after Shelly's heart puncture at the University Hospital, Dr. Healy met 
with his attorney brother and discussed the case. With the help of the Healys' sister, 
Diane DeVries ("DeVries") (the Relief Society President for the Hipwells' L.D.S. ward 
and an employee of Dr. Healy), Attorney Healy was secretly associated on Shelly's case 
without the knowledge of the Hip well family. Approximately four months after Shelly's 
heart puncture, her medical negligence case against the University Hospital was settled 
by Attorney Healy in a manner that purported to release all health care providers. This 
settlement occurred without litigation and with no real investigation into Dr. Healy's or 
IHC's conduct. The case was settled for $250,000.00, the amount of a prior statutory 
cap on damages against the University Hospital which had been removed by this Court 
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several weeks before the Hipwell settlement occurred. In the present case, Dr. Healy and 
IHC have jointly claimed the protection of the release obtained by Attorney Healy in the 
settlement with the University Hospital. 
The Hipwells initially sued Attorney Healy and his co-counsel, Roger Sharp 
("Sharp"), for malpractice. (See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993).) In the 
course of the investigation regarding that claim, the negligence of Dr. Healy and IHC 
was revealed. In 1992, the Hipwells filed suit against the Defendants. [R.l] 
In 1995, the district court dismissed all of the Hipwells' claims on statute of 
limitations grounds. [R. 1344-1347] 
In 1997, this Court in Jensen reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded 
for trial with the guidance that Hipwells' fraud/fraudulent concealment claims would be 
governed by a two year statute of limitations. [R. 1426-1455] 
In October, 1999, a jury trial limited to the statute of limitations issue was held. 
The Hipwells objected to this bifurcation as well as the district court's ruling which 
precluded any evidence of Attorney Healy's involvement in covering up his brother's 
negligence. Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict in the Hipwells' favor. [R. 2423] 
Thereafter, Dr. Healy and IHC filed a joint "Motion to Confirm Dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' Fraud Claim." [R. 2668-2677] By Memorandum Decision dated May 19, 
5 
2000, and an Order dated June 5, 2000, the district court again dismissed the Hip wells' 
fraud claims, this time ruling that this Court's decision in Jensen had done so even 
though this Court had remanded the fraud claims for trial on the merits.[R. 2750-2758] 
The district court also denied the Hipwells' motion to amend their complaint to 
allege that Dr. Healy acted as IHC's agent or was in privity with IHC and acted at least 
in part to further IHC's interest so that IHC was liable for Dr. Healy's fraudulent conduct 
because the district court dismissed the fraud claim. [R. 2750-2758] 
The Hipwells timely filed a petition to this Court for an interlocutory appeal 
which was denied on August 25, 2000. [R. 2993] The district court's dismissal of the 
Hipwells' fraud claims left only their medical negligence claims against the Defendants 
for trial. 
On March 21, 2001, the district court issued rulings on two pretrial motions as 
follows: 
A. That evidence of Dr. Healy's conduct with his attorney brother 
amounting to an obstruction of justice would be admissible as an admission by 
conduct despite the dismissal of Hipwells' fraud claims [R. 4568]; and 
B. That the Hipwells' obstetrical medical expert, Dr. Greggory Devore, 
could give an opinion that the standard of care had been breached by IHC's 
6 
emergency room in the treatment of Shelly's obstetrical symptoms. [R. 4568-
4569; R. 5016 at pp. 24-26] 
On March 27, 2001, trial commenced. In opening statement, the Hipwells 
advised the jury that medical negligence had occurred at McKay-Dee Hospital beginning 
with Shelly's treatment at the Emergency Room there and that attempts were 
subsequently made to conceal that medical negligence. [R 5003 pp. 197-198; 204-208] 
The Hipwells specifically advised the jury regarding the Healy brothers' conduct 
involving concealment, namely the steps taken to have Attorney Healy become Shelly's 
lawyer and the subsequent quick settlement of Shelly's case without any investigation 
into Dr. Healy. [IdL at pp. 223-225] 
Subsequently, during the presentation of the Hipwells' case, the district court 
reversed both its pre-trial rulings. The district court refused to allow the Hipwells to 
present any evidence of the Healy brothers' obstruction of justice and also refused to 
allow Dr. Devore to give My opinion regarding a breach of the standard of care by 
IHC's emergency room in the treatment of Shelly. [R. 5008 at pp. 1226-1259; R. 5004 
at pp. 398-402; 415;420-421; R. 5016 at pp. 1-18] 
At the conclusion of the Hipwells' case, the district court granted the Defendants' 
motion to dismiss that portion of the Hipwells' medical negligence claims relating to the 
7 
IHC emergency room. The district court instructed the jury, over the Hipwells' 
objection, that the IHC emergency room was not negligent in its treatment of Shelly. [R. 
5011 at pp. 1814-1815; 4904] The Hipwells properly objected to this instruction. [R. 
5014 at pp. 2348-2349] 
On April 15, 2001, the jury returned a verdict for the Defendants, finding that 
they were not negligent in their treatment of Shelly. [R. 4930] Judgment was entered on 
that verdict on April 24, 2001. [R. 4939] 
The Hipwells filed their Notice of Appeal on May 23, 2001. [R. 4966] 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Emergency Room Malpractice 
1. In December, 1988, Shelly was 26 years old and was in the third trimester 
of her pregnancy with her second child. Dr. Healy was her obstetrician. [R. 5006 at p. 
915 and Ex. 1 pp. 000002] 
2. Shortly before 6:00 a.m. on the morning of December 12, 1988, Shelly 
presented herself at the emergency room of McKay-Dee complaining of severe pains 
under her ribs that she had been experiencing since midnight. [R. 5004 at pp. 403-404; 
5009 at pp. 1540-1541]. Dr. Healy's records with respect to Shelly had previously been 
delivered to McKay-Dee. [R. 5004 at pp. 380 and 388.] These records gave base 
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readings on Shelly's platlets, blood pressure and protein in the urine. [Id. at 389-390] 
The records were available to the emergency room. [R. 5006 at p. 921] 
3. Shelly was treated by Dr. King in the emergency room. According to the 
Hipwells' expert, Dr. Greggory Devore ("Dr. Devore"), tests conducted by the 
emergency room staff showed that Shelly had an abnormal elevation of blood pressure, 
an almost thirty percent drop in blood platlets, and abnormal (one plus) protein in the 
urine. [R. 5004 at pp. 329-331 and 407-411] This was the first time she had more than 
trace protein in her urine. [R. 5008 at p. 931] Dr. King also noted that Shelly had 
epigastric pain. [R. 5004 at pp. 407-411] 
4. Pre-eclampsia is a disease which affects only pregnant woman. The usual 
diagnostic criteria for pre-eclampsia are elevated blood pressure and protein in the urine. 
[Id. at pp. 320-321] If a patient has pre-eclampsia, a physician is on heightened alert for 
severe pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome. If epigastric pain is also present, pre-
eclampsia is considered severe. HELLP syndrome is a variant form of severe pre-
eclampsia. The target organ of HELLP syndrome is the liver. Epigastric pain is a 
common symptom of liver damage and internal bleeding within, or on the surface of, the 
liver. The liver can rupture as a result of the damage caused by HELLP syndrome. 
Liver damage can be confirmed by doing a blood test to see if liver enzymes are 
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elevated. Severe pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome can cause death or serious 
permanent injury to the mother. The only treatment for severe pre-eclampsia/HELLP 
syndrome is immediate delivery of the baby. [Id. at pp. 321, 331-339 and 348-351] 
5. Intrauterine Growth Retardation ("IUGR") means that the fetus is smaller 
than normal. [R. 5004 at p. 313] IUGR patients are more susceptible to develop HELLP 
syndrome. [R. 5006 at p. 919] During Shelly's pregnancy, Dr. Healy categorized Shelly 
as a high risk obstetrical patient because of IUGR and asked for consultations by high 
risk maternal fetal medicine specialists at IHC, Dr. Devore and Dr. Stephen Clark. [Id. at 
p. 918] Dr. Devore was, at the time, the head of the maternal fetal medicine department 
at IHC. [R. 5004 at pp. 276-278; 281-282] 
6. The IHC emergency room did not conduct a liver function test to 
determine if Shelly had suffered liver damage. [R. 5009 at p. 1425] No liver function test 
was performed until December 14, a day after delivery. [R. 5004 at pp. 438-442] 
Instead, Shelly was sent home from the emergency room with Tylenol and the 
emergency room physician made note to follow-up with Dr. Healy ("f/u Dr. Healy"). [Id. 
at pp. 405-406] Dr. Healy denied that he was informed of the emergency room visit. [R. 
5006 at pp. 925 and 935] Dr. Healy admitted that if the diagnosis of HELLP syndrome 
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had been made on December 12, he probably would have delivered the baby that day. [R. 
5006 at p. 920] 
7. Dr. Devore was consulted on December 13 and immediately sent Shelly to 
labor and delivery. Shelly was in labor and delivery within approximately ten minutes of 
when Dr. Devore saw her. [R. 5004 at pp. 430-434] Shelly delivered by emergency 
cesarean section performed by Dr. Healy in the evening of December 13, 1988. [Id. at 
pp. 447-448] Dr. Devore opined that given the information from the emergency room 
tests, the baby should have been delivered at the time of the emergency room visit on 
December 12 or that morning because her symptoms were hallmarks for severe pre-
eclampsia. [Id. at pp. 422-423 and 442] Shelly was suffering from HELLP syndrome 
prior to the time she gave birth. [Id. at p. 444] Dr. Devore testified that the failure to 
deliver the baby on the morning of December 12 was below the standard of care. [Id. at 
p. 445] Dr. Devore further testified that the severe complications Shelly suffered could 
have been avoided had she been delivered timely. [Id. at pp. 446-447] 
8. Shelly had elevated blood pressure, low platlets, and spontaneous bleeding 
under the skin following delivery. [Id. at pp. 464-467] At approximately 10:30 a.m. on 
the following morning, December 14, 1988, Shelly had a hypotensive crisis involving 
plummeting blood pressure, rapid heart rate (tachycardia), and other physical signs and 
11 
symptoms indicating that she was in shock due to loss of blood. At approximately 11:00 
a.m. on December 14, 1988, Shelly was admitted to the McKay-Dee intensive care unit 
("ICU"). [Id. at p. 467-474] Her care was co-managed in the ICU by Dr. Baughman, the 
director of the ICU (an IHC employee) and Dr. Healy. [R. 5006 at p. 935; R. 5011 at pp. 
1889-1890] Dr. Baughman diagnosed Shelly as suffering from HELLP syndrome and 
being in shock due to internal bleeding. [Id. at pp. 1842, 1917-1923; R. 5004 at pp. 480-
483] Shelly's abdomen was distended upon arrival at the ICU and continued to become 
more distended during the next seven hours there. [R. 5011 at p. 1915] Dr. Baughman 
recognized that internal bleeding was a likely cause of this distention. [Id. at pp. 1926] 
While in the ICU from 11:00 a.m. to approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 14, 1988, no 
objective tests such as a CT Scan or ultrasound were conducted by Dr. Baughman or Dr. 
Healy to determine the source of Shelly's internal bleeding. [R. 5008 at pp. 1196-1197] 
9. At approximately 5:30 p.m. on December 14, 1988, Dr. Baughman and Dr. 
Healy requested (for the first time that day) a surgical consultation by Dr. Alder. [R. 
5012 at pp. 2156-2158; R. 5005 at pp. 551-552] Upon examination, Dr. Alder 
immediately ordered Shelly to surgery. Dr. Alder's pre-operative diagnosis was that 
Shelly likely had a ruptured liver. At surgery, it was determined that Shelly's liver had 
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ruptured and that she had lost approximately 60 percent of her blood volume into her 
distended abdomen. [R. 5008 at pp. 1264-1267; 1275-1276; R. 5005 at pp. 554-556] 
10. Following surgery, and as a result of Shelly's prolonged internal bleeding 
during her course in the ICU, she became critically ill, developing Adult Respiratory 
Distress Syndrome ("ARDS") and sepsis. [R. 5005 at pp. 557-561; 570-571; R. 5008 at 
pp. 1209-1210] 
11. There was a concern by Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman that Shelly's 
abdominal caesarean section wound may have been developing a potentially lethal 
bacterial condition known as necrotizing fasciitis. The appropriate treatment for this 
condition was surgical removal of the tissue in the area of concern and antibiotics. [R. 
5009 at p. 1471; R. 5008 at pp. 1216-1223] 
12. On December 21, 1988, Dr. Alder conducted a surgical debridement of 
tissue in the area of Shelly's abdominal wound and she was followed with antibiotics. 
Dr. Alder did not believe that Shelly had necrotizing fasciitis. As Shelly's treating 
surgeon, he so advised Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman. The McKay-Dee pathology report 
on the tissue removed by Dr. Alder indicated that Shelly did not have the lethal form of 
necrotizing fasciitis about which Dr. Baughman was allegedly concerned. Dr. Alder's 
follow-up examinations on December 22, and December 23, 1988, revealed that Shelly's 
13 
abdominal wound was "healthy-appearing" and was improving. [R. 5008 at pp. 1280-
1291; R. 5005 at pp. 586-593 and 597-598] 
The Fraud/Fraudulent Concealment Claims 
13. Dr. Baughman and Dr. Healy believed that Shelly was probably going to 
die because of her critically ill state. [R. 5008 at pp. 1216-1222; R. 5012 at pp. 2143-
2144] 
14. The McKay-Dee ICU was capable of treating Shelly's critical illness. [R. 
5011 at pp. 1889-1890] Nevertheless, on December 23, 1988, Dr. Healy and Dr. 
Baughman had Shelly transferred, via helicopter, in a critically ill state and on a 
ventilator, to the University Hospital in Salt Lake City. [R. 5008 at pp. 1221-1222] The 
only reason set forth in Shelly's medical chart for this transfer was Dr. Healy's and Dr. 
Baughman's alleged concern that Shelly had necrotizing fasciitis. [R. 5011 at pp. 1889-
1890] Dr. Healy admitted at trial that he thought Shelly was going to die and that was 
part of the reason he transferred her. [R. 5008 at pp. 1218-1219] The Hipwell family 
was not consulted, nor did they give their consent to this transfer. [R. 5010 at pp. 1736-
1738] 
15. Upon arrival at the University Hospital, it did not appear that Shelly had 
necrotizing fasciitis, and she never developed necrotizing fasciitis at the University 
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Hospital. [R. 5008 at p. 1220; R. 5005 at p. 608] Nevertheless, no attempts were made 
to return Shelly to the IHC system by Dr. Baughman or Dr. Healy. [R. 5008 at pp. 1220-
1221] 
16. Several weeks after her arrival at the University Hospital, in the course of a 
sternal bone marrow biopsy performed by a resident, the biopsy needle penetrated 
through Shelly's sternum and into her heart, causing a laceration of the heart. This heart 
puncture, superimposed upon Shelly's already critically ill condition, caused her to suffer 
severe anoxic brain injury. Shelly would not have suffered the brain injury but for the 
critical condition she was in from her treatment at McKay-Dee. [R. 5007 at pp. 987-989; 
1017-1020] 
17. Dr. Healy recognized that he was a potential defendant in Shelly's medical 
negligence claim against the University Hospital. [R. 3776] Two days after Shelly's 
heart was punctured at the University Hospital, Dr. Healy met with his brother, Attorney 
Tim Healy ("Attorney Healy") and discussed Shelly's medical negligence case. Dr. 
Healy told Attorney Healy that "Some attorney is really going to clean up on this one." 
[R. 846-863; 3670-3671; 3772-3786] 
18. Thereafter, Attorney Healy discussed the matter with the Healys' sister, 
DeVries. DeVries was the Mormon Church Relief Society President for the Hip wells' 
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L.D.S. ward and knew the Hipwell family through her church work. DeVries was also at 
the time an employee of Dr. Healy. DeVries contacted the Hipwells and urged them to 
see Sharp in Salt Lake City. DeVries did not tell the Hipwells that she was Dr. Healy's 
sister. [R. 846 and 3670] 
19. The Hipwells met with and retained Sharp. Subsequently, and without the 
knowledge of the Hipwell family, Sharp associated Attorney Healy on the case, agreeing 
to give him forty percent of the fee for little or no work. [R. 846-847 and 3670] 
20. In a letter dated February 13, 1989, Attorney Healy wrote to Sharp: 
Dear Rog: 
It is my understanding from our telephone 
conversation last Thursday or Friday, that you are in the 
process of obtaining the medical records on Shellie Hipwell 
from the counsel for the University of Utah Medical Center. 
I have alerted my brother to the fact that you may be 
requesting copies of his medical records which is a routine 
procedure at this point. I have advised him that Shellie's 
family had not expressed any concern or dissatisfaction over 
his treatment. I would appreciate receiving copies, Rog, of 
the various correspondence and requests for medical 
records, reports, etc., in this case in order that I may 
maintain an up-to-date file. 
I am sure that we are both pleased that with some 
extensive follow up efforts, we were able to get the husband 
and mother of Shellie Hipwell into see you and sign a 
retainer agreement for handling the case. I believe that an 
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appropriate fee-sharing arrangement in this case would be a 
40% - 60% split, with 40%o of the legal fee coming to me and 
60% to yourself I think that we both understand that the 
case was generated by my brother's indepth discussion of the 
case with me and his desire that the case be handled by 
someone who would provide good, competent representation 
in Shellie 's behalf 
Thereafter, as you know, I spoke with my sister, 
Diane, who lives in the same ward as Shellie Hipwell, and 
who is the Relief Society President. She shared our concern 
and did make contact with the family, initially with the 
mother and subsequently with her husband. She, of course, 
emphasized the need for Shellie to have the best possible 
counsel, provided them with your name and telephone 
number and confirmed their desire to schedule an 
appointment ASAP. 
According to the discussions which I had with my 
brother, this case should be a very substantial one which 
should result in a sizeable settlement. He has also indicated, 
that in his opinion, the malpractice was very clear and 
should not involve the need for litigation. I assume that the 
proposed aforesaid fee-sharing arrangement is satisfactory. 
If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call. 
[R. 847-848] 
21. By the date of this letter, Dr. Healy was aware that his brother was 
associated as an attorney on Shelly's medical negligence case. After being associated as 
co-counsel on Shelly's case, Attorney Healy began communicating privileged 
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information to Dr. Healy, specifically that the Hipwell family did not suspect Dr. Healy 
of medical negligence in his care of Shelly. [R. 849 and 3671] 
22. Documents prepared by Dr. Healy, which linked his care of Shelly with her 
subsequent brain injury, were not provided to Sharp or Attorney Healy by Dr. Healy. 
Furthermore, Sharp and Attorney Healy did not obtain a complete set of medical records 
from McKay-Dee. [R. 850-852 and 3671] 
23. On May 1, 1989, in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989) this Court abolished the $250,000 cap on damages against the University 
Hospital. At about the time the Condemarin decision came down, Dr. Healy had 
discussions with Attorney Healy regarding the settlement of Shelly5 s medical negligence 
case. Attorney Healy told Dr. Healy that if Shelly was likely to die in the near future her 
case should be settled as soon as possible. [R. 853-854 and 3671] 
24. At the time of these discussions, Shelly had been returned to the McKay-
Dee Rehabilitation Facility and Dr. Healy was not involved in Shelly's care there. At the 
request of his attorney brother, Dr. Healy visited Shelly at the McKay-Dee Rehabilitation 
Facility. [R. 3671] 
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25. Dr. Healy reported back to attorney Healy that Shelly's life expectancy was 
short. Dr. Healy was aware that the cost of Shelly's future care given her brain injured 
condition would be approximately $5,000,000. [R. 853-854 and 3671] 
26. Without mentioning Dr. Healy's name, Sharp advised the Hipwell family 
that he had discussed Shelly's case with several doctors and their opinion was that Shelly 
would die in the very near future. On the basis of this, Sharp urged the Hipwell family to 
settle Shelly's claims against the University of Utah for $250,000, notwithstanding the 
removal of the cap in that amount by the Condemarin case. [R. 854-857 and 3671] 
27. After the Hipwell family agreed to settle the case for this amount, Sharp 
introduced Attorney Healy as his assistant for purposes of obtaining court approval of 
the settlement. The Hipwell family was never told that Attorney Healy was associated as 
co-counsel on Shelly's medical negligence case. [R. 811 and 815-816] 
28. On the advice of attorneys Healy and Sharp, the Hipwell family signed a 
release which purported to release not only the University Hospital, but all other health 
care providers involved in Shelly's care. In the present lawsuit, Dr. Healy and IHC 
jointly (but unsuccessfully) claimed the protection of this release. [R. 44-45 and 54] 
29. Shelly's case was settled in late May, 1989, a little over four months after 
her heart puncture at the University Hospital, for $250,000. [R. 857-858] 
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30. Subsequently, the Hipwell family learned that Shelly was likely to live a 
reasonably normal life expectancy and retained counsel to investigate Shelly's 
representation by Sharp. In the course of that investigation, the connection between 
Sharp, Attorney Healy and Dr. Healy was revealed. [R. 1249-1254] 
Dr. Devore's Testimony Concerning the Emergency Room Malpractice 
31. Dr. Devore is a physician practicing in Pasadena, California, and also in 
Detroit, Michigan. He graduated from the University of Utah Medical School in 1975. 
He served his internship in internal medicine at Yale University. He served his residency 
training in obstetrics and gynecology at Yale University, which he completed in 1979. 
He then became an obstetrician and gynecologist and an obstetric surgeon. Following 
completion of his residency, he trained for two additional years in the sub-speciality of 
maternal fetal medicine which is the study of pregnancy complications involving women 
and their fetus or unborn child. Following that training, he practiced as a specialist in 
high risk obstetrics. [R. 5004 at pp. 276-279] 
32. Dr. Devore then became a professor at the University of Southern 
California, which, at the time, was housed at the Los Angeles County Women's Hospital 
which was the largest hospital in the United States in terms of numbers of babies 
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delivered. He was involved in the supervision of labor and delivery. He also was 
responsible for training residents in maternal fetal medicine. [Id. at pp. 279-280] 
33. In 1987, he joined IHC as Corporate Director of Maternal Fetal Medicine 
for high risk obstetrics responsible for supervising the obstetrical operations of IHC. The 
concept was to have a "vertically integrated" program where he would be involved in the 
care of high risk obstetric patients throughout the IHC hospital system and in teaching 
IHC physicians how to care for high risk patients. [Id. at 281] 
34. Dr. Devore is board certified in obstetrics and gynecology and in maternal 
fetal medicine. [Id. at p. 280] Dr. Devore regularly teaches in the areas of high risk 
obstetrics around the country. [Id. at p. 288-289] 
35. When Dr. Devore began his training in internal medicine at Yale 
University, one of his responsibilities was to work in the emergency room. He spent 
numerous hours working in the emergency room evaluating patients, triaging patients, 
sending them to be admitted to the hospital or seeking surgical consultations, or in some 
cases, obstetrical consultations. When he moved to obstetrics and gynecology he 
covered the emergency room as well. During his three years as a resident, he covered the 
emergency room hundreds of times. He had "huge experience" in the emergency room 
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evaluating obstetrical patients and adult patients. He also observed other emergency 
rooms physicians taking in patients and referring out patients. [Id. at pp. 292-293] 
36. During the time Dr. Devore was at the University of Southern California, 
from 1981 through 1987, he was also involved in seeing and evaluating patients in the 
emergency room. During that same period of time, he had a private practice in several 
hospitals in the Los Angeles area and would see patients coming through the emergency 
room and was actively involved in the emergency room through 1987 prior to moving to 
Utah. [Id. at 293-294] 
37. Dr. Devore similarly had experience with surgical emergencies and 
training for such emergencies, including emergency room experience. [Id. at pp. 299-
301] 
38. After joining IHC in 1987, Dr. Devore had occasion to observe the manner 
in which obstetric patients were processed through the emergency room department. 
Patients that would come to the emergency room would be evaluated in the emergency 
room by the resident or the emergency room physician who would then call the 
obstetrical resident or the private obstetrician and Dr. Devore would get involved as the 
case evolved. It was a common practice for a patient coming to the emergency room at 
LDS Hospital to be seen by the emergency room physician and then immediately 
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evaluated by an obstetrician or a resident obstetrician. Occasionally, Dr. Devore would 
go down to the emergency room to see the patient. Moreover, Dr. Devore visited 
hospitals in the IHC system to teach IHC physicians the standard of care when a third 
trimester obstetric patient with Shelly's symptoms presented to the emergency room and 
was involved in a training program for IHC to teach family practitioners in rural 
hospitals with respect to obstetrical care and that involved emergency room situations. 
[Id. at p. 295 and 416-441] 
39. During the time he was with IHC, he was familiar with its accepted custom 
and practice with regard to how obstetric patients would be dealt with if they entered the 
system through the emergency room. Because emergency room physicians are not 
obstetricians or gynecologists when a pregnant woman came to the emergency room 
having a complaint, there was to be an obstetrical evaluation to determine the effect of 
the pregnancy on her condition. The quarterback on all issues involving a pregnancy 
was to be the obstetrician. [Id. at pp. 295-297] In fact, in his experience at Yale 
University, as well as the hospitals in Los Angeles, the emergency room physicians did 
not take upon themselves responsibilities of an obstetrician when they were evaluating 
an obstetrician patient in the emergency room. An obstetrician/gynecologist was 
suppose to be called in to see the patient. [Id. at pp. 297-298] 
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40. Dr. Devore had substantial experience with respect to the standard of care 
for an emergency room physician with an obstetric patient in the third trimester with the 
information that was gathered concerning Shelly where she had a dramatic drop in her 
platelet counts, abnormal blood pressure, protein in her urine and epigastric pain 
indicating possible severe pre-eclampsia. [Id. at pp. 407-414] The hospitals at which he 
obtained this knowledge included Yale New Haven Hospital, Los Angeles Woman's 
Hospital, and Cedars-Sinai Hospital. [Id. at pp. 415-416] 
41. Dr. Devore testified that in all his experience there was a uniform standard 
of care on what was done when an obstetric patient presented to an emergency room 
with the information such as gathered on Shelly's condition. [Id. at pp. 420-421] Dr. 
Devore testified that when an obstetrical patient comes into the emergency room in the 
third trimester, and information is obtained such as in Shelly's case, the emergency room 
physician should contact the obstetrician and give the information to the obstetrician. 
However, the district court struck this answer on the basis of foundation [Id. at p. 415] 
Dr. Devore was not permitted to testify that the McKay-Dee emergency room breached 
the standard of care in its treatment of Shelly. [Id. at pp. 398-402, 457-459 and 420-421] 
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Marshaling the Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict 
That Dr. Healv and IHC Were Not Negligent 
The jury rendered its special verdict determining that Dr. Healy and IHC were not 
negligent in their treatment of Shelly. The Hipwells concede that Dr. Healy and IHC 
presented sufficient evidence - - principally the testimony of their experts, Dr. James 
Martin and Dr. Joseph Civetta - - to support this verdict. The Hipwells are not 
contending on this appeal that the judgment should be reversed because the jury could 
not have reasonably concluded as it did based on the evidence actually presented to the 
jury. Instead, the Hipwells argue that the special verdict should be overturned because 
the evidence the district court excluded concerning Dr. Healy's conduct in covering up 
the malpractice and Dr. Devore's opinion on the negligence in the emergency room 
deprived the jury of having all of the relevant evidence in deciding the negligence issues. 
If this evidence had not been erroneously excluded, the jury may well have rendered a 
verdict in favor of the Hipwells. However, the Hipwells will nevertheless summarize the 
evidence presented by Defendants supporting the jury's verdict. 
The Defendants' experts testified that as set forth in paragraphs a through g 
below: 
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a. It is rare for patients with HELLP syndrome to develop bleeding into the 
liver. Dr. Martin's best estimate was that bleeding occurs only in 1 in 45,000 to 1 in 
225,000 births. [R. 5009 at pp. 1364-1365] In 1988, the only treatment for HELLP 
syndrome was delivery of the baby and supportive medical care. [Id. at p. 1361] 
b. When Shelly was tested in the emergency room, her EKG, blood count and 
blood pressure were normal. There was a trace of protein in her urine. [Id. at pp. 1376-
1379] The emergency room records did not show an opinion of epigastric pain, but a 
description of epigastric pain would not have made much difference given the other 
testing. [Id. at pp. 1376-1337 and 1428-1429] If Dr. Healy had been advised of the 
information contained in the emergency room record, he would not have been required to 
do anything different with respect to the timing of Shelly's delivery. [R. 5009 at p. 1379] 
c. Dr. Healy delivered the baby in a timely way. [Id. at p. 1380-1381] Once 
the delivery was completed, there was nothing Dr. Healy could have done that would 
have changed Shelly's outcome. [Id. at p. 1381] 
d. When Dr. Healy was told about Shelly's bleeding at 10:45 a.m. on 
December 14, 1988, he immediately transferred Shelly into the ICU. [Id. at pp. 1386-
1387] Dr. Baughman managed Shelly's care in the ICU appropriately. [R. 5010 at p. 
1564] Shelly did not have significant bleeding from the time she was in the ICU until 
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approximately 17:00 on December 14. Shelly did not have a ruptured liver until that 
point. [R. 5009 at pp. 1388-1389; R. 5010 at pp. 1565-1566] There is no indication from 
the time Shelly was admitted to the ICU until about 17:00 that she should be taken to 
surgery. [R. 5009 at p. 1391; R. 5010 at p. 1565] The liver rupture was diagnosed timely 
and the surgery was done as fast as it could be done. [R. 5009 at 1394; R. 5010 at p. 
1564] There was nothing that Dr. Healy or Dr. Baughman could have done to prevent 
Shelly's liver rupture or complications she suffered while at McKay-Dee. [R. 5009 at p. 
1396; R. 5010 atp. 1580] 
e. Necrotizing fasciitis is very rare but is very rapid in progression and if it is 
not anticipated the mother can die. [R. 5009 at p. 1396] Shelly was at a greater risk for 
this problem. [Id. at p. 1397] It was reasonable for Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman to be 
concerned about necrotizing fasciitis. [Id. at pp. 1400-1401] It was perfectly appropriate 
to decide to transfer Shelly to the University Hospital. [Id. at pp. 1402-1403] 
f. The cause of Shelly5 s brain injury was lack of blood flow to the brain 
caused by the puncture of her heart at the University Hospital. There were no 
contributing factors. [R. 5013 at pp. 2285-2289] 
g. Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman complied with the standard of care in their 
treatment of Shelly. [R. 5009 atp. 1403; R. 5010 at pp. 1563-1565] 
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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The district court erred in dismissing the Hip wells' fraud claims on the basis of 
this Court's prior ruling in Jensen. This Court did not dismiss the fraud claims in 
Jensen. The Court instead determined that the two year Medical Malpractice Act 
statute of limitations applied to those claims and remanded the fraud claims to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
B. The district court erred in denying leave to amend the Hip wells' fraud claims to 
allege that a privity or agency relationship existed between Dr. Healy and IHC 
and Dr. Healy was acting to further the interests of IHC. The sole basis for the 
denial was the district court's erroneous conclusion that this Court in Jensen 
dismissed the fraud claims. The Hipwells timely sought leave to amend in 
accordance with the scheduling order and Defendants did not argue or 
demonstrate any prejudice if leave to amend were to be granted. 
C. The district court erred in refusing to permit evidence that Dr. Healy and his 
attorney brother fraudulently concealed the medical negligence of Dr. Healy and 
IHC. Evidence of the statements and conduct of Dr. Healy and the other 
conspirators to conceal the malpractice was admissible as an admission by 
conduct. That evidence was not only highly relevant to whether Dr. Healy 
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believed he had committed malpractice, but could have had a substantial impact 
on Dr. Healy's credibility with the jury. The jury may have concluded that Dr. 
Healy had information concerning the emergency room visit and should have 
delivered Shelly early in the morning of December 12. Exclusion of evidence 
under Rule 403 on the ground of prejudice is an extraordinary remedy that should 
be used sparingly. The evidence would not have unfairly prejudiced Defendants 
nor would any prejudice have substantially outweighed its probative value. 
D. The district court erred in refusing to allow the Hip wells' medical expert, Dr. 
Devore, to give an opinion regarding breach of the standard of care by IHC's 
emergency room. Dr. Devore was fully qualified to testify concerning the 
standard of care in the emergency room. Dr. Devore was knowledgeable 
concerning that standard of care by virtue of his years of experience and position 
as head of the Maternal Fetal Medicine Department at IHC at the time of Shelly's 
injuries. Moreover, the standard of care required that the emergency room 
physician refer Shelly to an obstetrician for treatment and Dr. Devore was 
knowledgeable concerning the standard of care for treatment by an obstetrician. 
Further, once the emergency room physician elected to treat Shelly he was subject 
to the standard of care applicable to an obstetrician. The district court erred in 
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dismissing the emergency room malpractice claim because of the exclusion of Dr. 
Devore's testimony and instructing the jury that the emergency room had not been 
negligence. This error also requires that the special verdict be set aside as to the 
other malpractice claims because the jury could well have determined that the 
other alleged acts of malpractice were less egregious than the emergency room 
malpractice and if the care in the emergency room did not breach the standard of 
care neither did the other acts. Also, the district court exclusion's of this evidence 
after the Hipwells' counsel referred to it in opening statement could have had a 
substantial impact on counsel's credibility with the jury. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE HIPWELLS9 
FRAUD CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF THIS COURT'S PRIOR RULING 
IN JENSEN. 
The Hipwells alleged in this action a conspiracy to fraudulently conceal Shelly's 
causes of action against the Defendants. As part of this conspiracy, Dr. Healy had Shelly 
transferred to the University Hospital on a pretext. After Shelly's heart was punctured, 
Dr. Healy and Attorney Healy had their sister, DeVries, who was the Relief Society 
President in Sherry Jensen's ward, solicit Mrs. Jensen to retain Sharp to represent Shelly 
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without disclosing DeVries relationship to Dr. Healy. Attorney Healy was then secretly 
associated as co-counsel with Sharp with an agreement that he would receive forty 
percent of the fee in return for little, if any, work. Attorney Healy and Sharp, with the 
assistance of Dr. Healy (who knew he was a potential defendant), then orchestrated a 
quick settlement of the case against the University Hospital without any lawsuit being 
filed or discovery being conducted and without any real investigation of Shelly's care by 
Dr. Healy and IHC. The Hipwells sought recovery for fraud and fraudulent concealment 
against Dr. Healy and for constructive fraud against all Defendants. [R. 277-298] The 
evidence adduced during discovery amply supported these allegations. [See, Statement of 
Facts ("SOF") Nos. 13-30] 
In 1995, Healy and IHC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The sole basis of 
the motion was that all of the Hipwells' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 
[R. 1270-1326] 
The district court erroneously granted summary judgment dismissing all of the 
Hipwells' claims solely on the basis that they were barred by the statute of limitations. 
However, the district court recognized that absent the bar of the statute of limitations, 
the fraudulent concealment claims presented issues of fact for determination by a jury, 
stating: 
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The fraud claims are also barred; however, if they were not 
barred [by the statute of limitations] the existence of material 
facts in dispute would make this issue one for the jury. [R. 
1328-1347] 
After this Court ruled in Jensen that fact issues existed with respect to whether the 
statute of limitations barred the Hipwells' claims and remanded the case (including the 
fraud claims) to the district court, a separate trial was held on the statute of limitations 
issue. The jury returned its verdict in favor of the Hipwells that their claims were not 
barred by the statute of limitations. [R. 2423] 
Thereafter, Dr. Healy and IHC filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Confirm 
Dismissal of Fraud Claims." [R. 2665-2676] The sole basis for the "motion" was that 
this Court's decision in Jensen had supposedly dismissed the fraud claims. By 
Memorandum Decision dated May 19, 2000, and an Order of June 5, 2000, the district 
court granted the motion and dismissed the Hipwells' fraud claims on the erroneous 
basis that this Court's decision in Jensen had dismissed those claims. [R. 2756-2758] 
1. In Jensen* the Supreme Court Specifically Confirmed the Continued 
Existence of the Hipwells9 Fraud Claims. 
In Jensen, the Hipwells argued that whether their claims were barred by a statute 
of limitations involved the resolution of factual issues that must be decided by a jury. In 
addition, the Hipwells argued that the three year general fraud statute of limitations 
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applied tu their fraud claims, rather than the two year statute of limitations contained in 
the Medical Malr v * 
In determining which statute of limitations shoi:M h- :v~-'<* v ^ • *v-u ; , r <^  
this Court analyzed the extent to which the fraud claims paralleled the claims for 
Irauduleni concealment ot medical malpractice. This Court concluded that there was 
sufficient simila*" • -: : -. .: .aaiuiw oi iimuat.^ns 
applies to cases of fraudulent concealment arisine at ui nicd- -\^v •• ^-. ' •'•••• 
at 336. . "he district court misinterpreted this analysis and used it as the specific basis for 
dismissing the Hipwells'" fraud claims.1 
However, Jensen c\cir]\ *.r n ,: .* ^n. . -iv • ;ir - :!: ' !M U _ *. -uirat.^T 
simply categorized them as claims for fraudulent concealment of medical malpractic " foi 
purposes of determining the appropriate statute of limitations. 
1
 1 lie Jensen Court's language concerning damages is clearly dicta as the issue, 
scope and amount of damages were not before the Court, In fact, at the time of the 
Jensen decision, there had been no discovery conducted other than on the statute of 
limitations. Dr. Healy and IHC had not moved for summary judgment on the basis that 
there were no damages or that damages were somehow insufficient to support a fraud 
claim and the issue of damages was not briefed. On that record, it would have been a 
violation of due process for this Court to have ruled the Hipwells had not suffered 
damages because the Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion had only been made and 
granted on the basis of the statute of limitations and the Hipwells had never even been 
given a hearing on the issue of damages. 
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2. The Supreme Court Affirmatively Ruled that the Hipwells' Fraud 
Claims Would be Governed by a Two Year Statute of Limitations, 
In Jensen, this Court remanded the entire case for trial (except the constructive 
fraud claim against IHC that the district court had dismissed on the merits) because it 
concluded that a jury should decide whether the two year medical malpractice statute of 
limitations barred the Hipwells5 fraudulent concealment claims. The continued existence 
of the Hipwells5 common law fraud claims for fraudulent concealment is confirmed by 
this Court's holding in Jensen "that Shelly5s family's claims for common law fraud are 
also governed by the two year medical malpractice statute of limitations found in Section 
78-14-4... "[Jensen at 337] 
This Court would not have bothered to tell the district court which statute of 
limitations applied to the Hipwells5 common law fraud claims if those claims were being 
dismissed by the Court. 
This Court's decision in Jensen did not dismiss the Hipwells5 fraudulent 
concealment claims. The district court erred in ruling that it did. 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE 
HIPWELLS LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE 
LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE SUPREME COURT'S PRIOR 
RULING IN THIS CASE, 
The Hipwells have not amended their Complaint in this case since 1993.2 After 
the I lipwells . •-.. ....:. = :ne statute of limitations issue, the district court set 
trial on the merits for November ?U0H wnih ;i \\v\\ discovery sehciliili 1'he dish irl 
court also set a deadline for amending the pleadings for January 31, 2000. [R. 2610] I he 
Hipwells timely moved to amend their complaint to allege in accordance with this 
i I * . . : ! . . i.;_ . . ..„. .luu.r^ un .. . icai> *» irauauien* 
concealment with his attorney brother ' r * :; , 
relationship existed between Dr. Healy and IHC and Di. Heal} was acv^v to further the 
interests of IHC. [R 2624-2647J3 
'
 ;
 ' .;: .iiiijiiujj complaint as 
part of the same order dismissing the Hipwells5 fraud claims. The sol.- !\i<;i< l.\ • c ; :. 
2
 From 1^93 inrougn me trial on the statute of limitations in October, 1999, the 
sole focus of the case w?* *he ^tati^e of limitations issues, including an appeal addressing 
that issue. 
3
 Jensen at 338. Although this language in the Jensen rehearing opinion was in the 
context of the statute of limitations issue, it obviously applies with equal force to liability 
issues. 
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the motion to amend the fraud claims was the district court's decision to dismiss the 
fraud claims based upon the district court's erroneous interpretation of this Court's 
ruling in Jensen. [R. 2750-2758] 
Under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend is to be 
granted liberally in the interests of justice. Moreover, Rule 15(a) should be interpreted 
liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated. Timm v. Dewsnup, 
815 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993). Denial of leave to amend is ordinarily reviewed on an 
abuse of discretion standard. However, where, as here, leave to amend is denied based 
on an erroneous legal ruling, the review is de novo. Fisher v. Roberts, 125 F.3d 974, 977 
(6th Cir. 1997); St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815 
(11th Cir. 1999) (where trial court's denial of leave to amend a complaint is due to 
futility, the denial is reviewed de novo.) See also, City ofMonticello v. Christiansen, 
788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990). 
The Hipwells timely moved for leave to amend in accordance with the district 
court's scheduling order. IHC and Dr. Healy did not demonstrate or even argue they 
would be prejudiced by an amendment. They only argued leave to amend should be 
denied on futility grounds based on this Court's decision in Jensen. [R. 2668] Because 
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the district court erred in ruling that Jensen mandated dismissal of the fraud claims, the 
district court's n'fns;il i<» 'tllaw siniendrneiU should jls<< he lev/rsed, 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
EVIDENCE THAT DR. HEALY AND HIS ATTORNEY BROTHER 
FRAUDULENTLY CONCEALED THE MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE OF 
DR. HEALY AND IHC. 
Pnnr U\ (lit1 linhilih lii.il llir Hipwells mil I .111 iiinifitiiiinv ol tJiiUoii, lilt nil a 
Motion to Allow Evidence of Admissions by Conduct on the Part of Defendant Di 
Healy. In that motion, the Hipwells made an offer of proof \\ iih respect to Dr. Healy's 
. . . . . . ..i attorney Healy and Sharp to conceal Shelly5s medical 
malpractice claim., apamsl hi \W\\\\ -iiidlll*1 \R U,70^^l ; ^"?^^S"" | l l r i hjiwclls 
argued that Dr. Healy's conduct attempting to hide these claims constituted an admission 
by conduct betraying an awareness of guilt or liability. The district court granted that 
motion t :) the extent tl lat the I lip vv ells w ere ei ititled to mtroduce evidence of things that 
Dr. Healy personally did or said from which th c i n *- < ' l : ' - - * * 1 -;. ^ * 
that Dr. Healy was involved in an unlawful obstruction of justice. [R. 5016, pp. 1-2; R. 
4568] However, prior to trial the district court ruled it would, not allow the Hipwells to 
present evidence of \\« hat other people did and said as pai t :*f Di I lea.].)/ ' s conspiracy v ith 
Attorney Healy and Sharp. [R. 5016, pp. 1-18, 24-26] 
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It was error for the district court to preclude the Hipwells from presenting 
evidence of what the co-conspirators, Attorney Healy, Sharp and Dr. Healy's sister, 
DeVries, did and said in furtherance of the conspiracy. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 11A 
P.2d 1141,1143 (Utah 1989); State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941); Cirios v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 373 S.E.2d 164, 167-168 (Va. App. 1988). The district 
court later compounded this error by reversing itself completely during trial and refusing 
to allow any evidence whatsoever of Dr. Healy's conduct in covering up the malpractice 
claim. 
The district court erroneously concluded that under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probativiness. [R. 1254-
1259] The district court only changed its mind and precluded the evidence after the 
Hipwells' counsel, in reliance upon the district court's initial ruling on this issue, had 
informed the jury during opening statements that the Hipwells would show Dr. Healy 
engaged in a cover up of his malpractice. [R. 5003, pp. 220-225] 
The district court committed clear error in excluding this evidence. The 
prejudicial effect of that exclusion was stunning and was exacerbated by the district 
court's excluding the evidence after the Hipwells opening statement, thus, substantially 
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w i.
 rM •: r'>:r1;r „;c ...,.;. , ; ;; ipw cJ;^  counsel un,, iiu uuv when the promised 
A party's conduct showing an awareness of euilt or liability is a form of 
admission, In its pretrial ruling dated March 21. 2uu i the district court noted at page 2: 
• -. parties do not dispute me ia\v m Utah is that 
w i ongdoing by a party "amounting to an obstruction of 
justice," can be regarded as an admission by conduct. 
[Citations omitted] [R. 4568] 
There is ample support among both legal scholars and the courts - in Utah and 
j . u:. ^ J. . vvuintn/- i • /;c ajnnssioh oi ^oi.v.ui^ i draymg an awareness of gin- ^ 
liabilit1 " .": : w-,.r . .
 : -v. 
that regard, McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence §273 at 660 (Second Ed. 
19 72) states: 
i-v^  uii^ ijL oe expected, wrongdoing by the party in 
connection with his case, amounting to an obstruction 
justice, is also commonly regarded as an admission b\ 
conduct. By resorting to wrongful devices, he is said to give 
ground for believing that he thinks his case is weak and not 
to be won by fair means. 
7b the sc line effec i; st ; '€ ; 2 \\ igmore, Section 73 (No 2) (Chadbourne Re\ 1979). 
Utah courts have embraced the doctrine of adniusion^ In rnndHi'i In ^ /.v" ! 
Loft, 17 P.2d 272 (Utah 1932) this Court, allowed the admission of a number of 
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inconsistent statements that a defendant had made regarding his lack of responsibility for 
the accident. The Court stated: 
We think the testimony was relevant and admissible, not 
upon the theory that the alleged statements or declarations 
were part of the res gestae, but as bearing upon and as 
indicative of the state of mind of the defendant with 
reference to the accident. 
[Quoting an older edition of Wigmore:] "It has always been 
understood - the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in 
human experience - that a party's falsehood *** and all 
similar conduct, is receivable against him as an indication of 
his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one, 
and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of 
the cause's lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does 
not apply itself necessarily to any specific fact in the cause, 
but operates indefinitely though strongly, against the whole 
mass of alleged facts constituting his cause." Wigmore on 
Evidence, Vol.1, §278, and cases cited. [17 P.2d at 276-277] 
More recently, in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983), the trial court 
allowed the apprehending officer of the accused to testify that the defendant said "I will 
kill you" to a passer-by whom the officer had asked to summon help. In upholding the 
trial court's decision to admit the evidence, this Court stated that "such conduct is 
relevant as an admission by conduct, "constituting circumstantial evidence of 
consciousness of guilt. . ." [663 P.2d at 165] [Emphasis added.] 
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^ J / ^ . ^ L .
 t .„ .. *^* ;•.,._ . . ..,i , / j .dv. Ji«t Uwienddi.: destroyed 
e\ idence admissible to sho vv conscioi isness of guilt); I : ""'i in is Ti 7 1 st and Sa\ >ing s Bt ink v. 
Ali, 425 N.E. 2d 1359 (111. App. 1981) (doctor's alteration of medical records to conceal 
negligence may be admitted into evidence as an admission by conduct); McNamara v. 
Exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an r \ r !-MY::P:: •.- -. T, ih.r • »e 
used sparingly. See, e.g., United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, :2^ i :v10in Cir. 20ui); 
United States v. Martinez, 2001 TT 9 \ r - T cxis 495^ H 0th C - , 2001 > The exclusion is 
not pr< * •*; ;• • : * :/ * iiiiiiili • substantia!;;- • aiwvu:. - .i.- r 
value of the evidence. Unfair prejudice "means an undue tendency to ~KiiLrest decision 
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." Tan, 254 
i.:-c .. ,;ie case at bar, the evidence of the cover up was highly relevant to Dr. 
I ! •• M . > . 
exactly what made the evidence admissible. See, McCool v. Gehret, 657 A.2d 269, 277-
78 (Del. 1995). This evidence would not have unfairly prejudiced Dr. Healy or IHC by 
The jury could have reasonably inferred from the cover up evidence sumnun/cd 
above (SOF Nos. 13-30) that Dr. Healy had engaged in a fraudulent conspiracy to cover-
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up his malpractice. This evidence was extremely probative on Dr. Healy's awareness of 
his malpractice. This evidence also could have had a profound impact on Dr. Healy's 
credibility with the jury when he denied that he believed that he had done anything 
wrong in his care of Shelly and when he denied he was given information on Shelly's 
visit to the emergency room. With this evidence, the jury may have rejected Dr. Healy's 
testimony and concluded that he believed he had committed malpractice, that he had the 
information concerning the emergency room visit and should have delivered Shelly early 
in the morning of December 12 as Dr. Devore testified. According to Dr. Devore, had 
this been done, the complications Shelly suffered and her ultimate death would have 
been avoided. 
Dr. Healy and Dr. Baughman were co-managing Shelly's care in the ICU and 
jointly decided to transfer her to the University Hospital without the Hipwells' consent. 
The jury could have concluded this was a pretext to conceal their malpractice and that 
Dr. Healy's subsequent actions to cover up the malpractice at McKay-Dee were 
undertaken to further this effort and at least in part to further the interests of IHC. 
The district court's refusal to allow this evidence seriously prejudiced the 
Hipwells in the presentation of their malpractice claim against Dr. Healy and IHC. 
Under Utah law, an erroneous decision to exclude evidence is harmful error "if absent 
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the error there is a reasonable l ikei. . i^„. -I an outcome moK iavorabiv. .u the appellant. 
State i ; Dunn , 850 I '" 2d I  2(31 1221 (I Jtah 1993) See ilso, <r« : u fla. s v I i; o ") ' 2 ele\ i sion 
Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Uiah 1996) (Error is harmful where "the likelihood of 
a different outcome in the absence of the error is sufficiently high so as to undermine 
: .. .• . \ . ; , : ;.:.. ; ,. , w ^ v i i ; ^ .;. J : , ^a:<- a. i\.\. I ;k j u d g m e n t 
should therefore be reversed and the ca se remanded foi a lie \ v lli ial 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING T O A L L O W T H E 
HIPWELLS' MEDICAL EXPERT TO GIVE AN OPINION REGARDING 
A BREACH OF THE STANDARD OF CARE BY IHC'S EMERGENCY 
ROOM, 
"
!
 '* ' : ' •! . :• , . . .* • j tn.- :• I--X-, .vV *
 : sdical 
experts, Dr. Devore and Dr. Barry Schifrin, from testifying at trial concerning certain 
matters, including Shelly's treatment in the McKay-Dee emergency room, on the basis 
they vv ere not • :p lalified to testify concerning such care [R 3980 4 00 / ] 
The district court denied this motion, finding that these individi lals we re q i lalifi :xi 
to testify regarding Shelly's obstetric treatment "assuming proper qualifications of the 
laying . :>i.ii..-.;;; lounaauon, i u. 4:x>6-4M)^; K. :>( . Oa ipp 24-2(>| 
Therefore, d:i iring opening statements, the I lipv > "lis' cc i iiisel on ltlined fc i tl le ji n > 
the medical malpractice that had occurred in Shelly 5s case beginning with her care in the 
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emergency room on the morning of December 12, 1988, when Shelly arrived suffering 
from severe epigastric pain with clear symptoms of pre-eclampsia\HELLP syndrome. 
Instead of appropriately treating her, the emergency room physician simply sent her 
home with Tylenol. [R. 5003 at pp. 197-198; 204-208] 
However, at trial, the district court reversed itself and refused to allow Dr. Devore 
to testify concerning the negligence of the emergency room, dismissed the claim 
concerning emergency room treatment and instructed the jury that the emergency room 
was not negligent. [R. 5004 at pp. 396-402; R. 5011 at pp. 1814-1815; R. 4904]4 The 
district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Devore's testimony. 
The district court's apparent basis for precluding Dr. Devore from testifying 
concerning whether the standard of care was breached in the emergency room was 
because Dr. Devore was not board certified in internal medicine or emergency medicine 
and did not consider himself qualified to sit for the American College of Emergency 
Physician boards and has never become familiar with any of the texts, journals or 
treatises involving emergency medicine, except as it related to pregnancy complications 
and that since Dr. Devore had worked in an emergency room at Yale how emergency 
4
 Because the district court would not allow Dr. Devore to testify concerning the 
emergency room treatment, the Hipwells did not call Dr. Schifrin because the ruling 
would have also precluded his testimony. 
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departments are staff ed ai id how tl ie>- function and are trained are totally different. [R. 
5004 at pp. 381 386] . -. • • . . . • 
However, the district court apparently applied the wrong legal standard in 
excluding Dr. Devore 's testimony. These facts only went to the weight to be accorded to 
Dr. De\ ore's testimony .,. and not tc • its adn lissibilitj - See, e.g .,, State q / I hah v Kel ley, 1 
P.3d 546, 550 (Utah 2000). The "critical factor in determining the competency of an 
expert is whether that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier oi luct in reviewing 
the issues before i t ' W essell v. Erickson Landscaping ( u., . , i \\2K. _;-W. _ V u Kii, 
l(ls^». 
Dr. Devore is an obstetrician/gynecologist specializing in maternal fetal medicine 
in high risk pregnancies. Pre-eclampsia and HELLP syndrome are recognized 
complications of high risk pregnancies an,;, ... .ac;., diseases only suffered by pregnant 
women. Di De\ oi e has w orked in emergency rooms and • - a s fi ill)/ familial \ v itl I 
emergency room procedures in the various hospitals at which he had worked with respect 
to the handling and treatment of obstetric patients. [SOF Nos. ? 1 -41] 
Di De v ore testified that the standai d of cai e w as i inifoi m in the hospitals at 
which he had worked and that he was familiar with the standard of care for emergency 
room care of a third trimester obstetrical patient such as Shelly. Dr. Devore specifically 
testified he was aware of IHC's policies and procedures in that regard during December 
of 1988 and January of 1989 when Shelly was treated because he was Director of 
Maternal Fetal Medicine for IHC at the time. Dr. Devore was competent to testify that 
an emergency room physician was not qualified to treat Shelly5 s symptoms, that the 
standard of care required that the physician consult with Dr. Healy and provide to Dr. 
Healy the information concerning Shelly's treatment that had been gathered in the 
emergency room and that this standard of care was breached. [SOF Nos. 38-41] 
Dr. Devore was fully qualified to testify as to whether an emergency room 
physician could properly and appropriately treat a high risk third trimester obstetrics 
patient just as a brain surgeon could appropriately testify as to whether a general 
practitioner is qualified to perform brain surgery. 
This Court has held that "ordinarily, a practitioner of one school of medicine is 
not competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner of 
another school." Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). However, this 
Court in Burton recognized exceptions to the rule, including where " sufficient 
foundation has been laid to show that the method of treatment - - and hence the standard 
of care - - is common to both schools." [711 P.2d at 248] Another exception recognized 
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lyy 1:1 le coi n I:s is \ v 1 len 1:1 le expei !: w itness is ki IO wledgeable aboi it tl le standard c i care c i 
another speciality. See, Dikeou v. Osborn, 811 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah App. 1994). 
Both of these exceptions apply in the case at bar. D' De\ ore \\ as knowledgeable 
about the emergency room standard of care and that standard require,i ;ne emergency 
room physician to refer Shell)/ to an obstetrician \ iici, becai i se Shell;; - coi lid onb • be 
appropriately treated by an obstetrician, Dr. Devore was knowledgeable concerning the 
applicable standard of care. Moreover, once the IHC emergency room physician 
undertook to treat Shelly, he was charged w ith the same stanaard oi care apphcaoie to a 
physician that w oi lid be qi lalified to treat her, See, W >• ' ' *'• • - ' ? . - , 
661 So.2d 714, 720 (Miss. 1995); Larsen v. Yelle, 246 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. 1976); 
Lewis v. Soriano, 374 So.2d 829, 831 (Miss. 1979). 
' . ; . . ' w. . , . . • t . . i . a l e p C i i , - , 
! > V - J - ' ; * ^ : , -. -i v \ A\- V tiMimi r "^  : consequent dismissal 
of the emergency room malpractice claim constituted clear error. This error requires 
reversal n> din-• •. u<. * upwells to present their emergency room malpractice claim to a 
claims because the refusal to permit Dr. Devore to testify that the standard of care was 
breached by the emergency room and the dismissal of the claim very well could have 
substantially impacted the jury's verdict. The evidence concerning the emergency room 
malpractice was compelling. The jury well may have believed from the evidence that it 
was extremely negligent for the emergency room to have simply sent Shelly home with 
Tylenol rather than appropriately treating her symptoms. Yet, the district court told the 
jury the emergency room had not been negligent and this claim was dismissed. The jury 
could have determined that the other claims of negligence against Dr. Healy and IHC 
involving their subsequent treatment of Shelly were less egregious and therefore 
concluded that if what the emergency room did was not negligent, neither was the 
subsequent treatment. 
Plaintiffs' case involves a continuum of medical negligence and concealment that 
was triggered by the negligence at the McKay-Dee Emergency Room. Absent that 
negligence, the subsequent medical negligence and concealment probably would not 
have occurred. The emergency room's failure to correctly diagnose or refer Shelly to an 
obstetrician caused a 36 hour delay in the delivery of Shelly's baby during which 
Shelly's liver was under attack from HELLP Syndrome. Shelly's liver rupture the 
morning after the birth probably would not have occurred had she been immediately 
delivered following her emergency room visit. [R. 5004 at pp. 444-447] 
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V\< ithout the ruptured liver, she would not have negligently been allowed to bleed 
internally for hoi irs in tl le ICI J resi llting in the critically ill conditio! 1 in \ hicl i she was 
shipped (without family permission) to the University of Utah Hospital. When Shelly's 
heart was negligently punctured at the University, her critically ill condition made it 
impossible to recover from the insult, resulting in a permanent semi-comatose state. 
attorney to conceal the medical negligence that had occurred at McKay-Dee Hospital. 
The Plaintiffs focused their case on the emergency room in both opening 
'b i' '^"..°h !: ] ^ ? r : preeclampsia (HHIJ P Sviivlror* ^ ir ihc emergency room and that 
the only treatment was immediate delivery. Even Dr. I leai\ admitted if HELLP had 
been diagnosed on the day of Shelly's emergency room visit, the baby would have been 
• delivered that da;; > [R 5006, pp 919 920.] Di D :^  ^ ore testified that failure to deli\ er 
Shelly's baby on this day breached the standard of care and resulted in the severe 
complications that Shelly subsequently suffered. [R 5004, pp. 444-447] Where the 
subsequent negligence and concealment inn\juu:.u., . ;: J emergency room 
malpractice dismissal of that claim serioi isl> ii npacte :i the remaining claims of 
negligence and the instruction to the jury that the emergency room had not been 
negligent was an improper comment on what was left of the Hipwells' case. 
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Moreover, once again, the district court's exclusion of this evidence and 
instruction that the emergency room was not negligent after the Hipwells had told the 
jury during opening statements that the evidence would show the emergency room was 
negligent could have substantially impacted the credibility of Hipwells5 counsel with the 
jury and colored the jury's view of all the evidence presented by the Hipwells. 
The Hipwells should be entitled to present all their evidence of malpractice to the 
jury and have the jury determine the Hipwells' claims based on the entirety of that 
evidence. The district court's exclusion of Dr. Devore's testimony cut the legs off the 
Hipwells' case and certainly undermines confidence in the jury's verdict. See, Jouflas 
supra. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Judgment should be reversed and the entire case remanded for a new trial. In the 
alternative, the case should be remanded for a new trial on the fraud and emergency room 
negligence claims. 
DATED this the <~} day of December, 2001. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Richard D. Burbidge 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Sherry Jensen and Shayne No* 950164 
Hipwell, individually and 
on behalf of all other heirs 
of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley 
Michele Hipwell and Kaycie 
Shaylene Hipwell appearing by 
Shayne Hipwell as guardian ad 
litem, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba 
McKay-Dee Hospital, and 
Michael J. Healy, M.D. and 
Does I through X, F I L E D 
Defendants, Appellees, 
and Cross-Appellant. April 4, 1997 
Third District, Salt Lake Div. I 
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki 
Attorneys: Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell, Gary R. 
Johnson, Salt Lake City, and Simon H. Forgette, 
Kirkland, Wash., for plaintiffs 
James W. Gilson, Kathy A. Lavitt, Salt Lake City, 
for IHC 
Elliott J. Williams, Kurt M. Frankenburg, Salt 
Lake City, for Dr. Healy 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee"), and 
Michael J. Healy, M.D. ("Dr. Healy"), ruling that plaintiffs 
Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell's action was barred by the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 78-14-4 of 
the Utah Code. Jensen and Hipwell appealed the grant of summary 
judgment under section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. We reverse 
and remand to the trial court for resolution of a fact question 
relevant to the tolling of the statute of limitations. 
A detailed recitation of the facts is necessary to 
understand the complex legal issues presented by this appeal. 
xx>Before we recite the facts, we note that in reviewing a grant 
of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.'" K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 
(Utah 1994) (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
233 (Utah 1993)). Because McKay-Dee and Dr. Healy moved for 
summary judgment, we state the facts in the light most favorable 
to Jensen and Hipwell. 
Sherry Jensen and Shayne Hipwell are, respectively, the 
surviving mother and husband of Shelly Hipwell. They seek to 
recover for Shelly's wrongful death on behalf of themselves and 
as legal guardians of Shelly's two minor daughters (collectively 
"Shelly's family") . On December 12, 1988, the day before a 
scheduled induced delivery of her second daughter, Shelly 
experienced severe abdominal pain and went to the emergency room 
of McKay-Dee Hospital. After being sent home, Shelly returned to 
McKay-Dee on December 13th for a caesarian delivery of her baby. 
Shelly experienced various complications at McKay-Dee after the 
delivery, which Shelly's family claims were the result of 
malpractice and negligence on the part of McKay-Dee and 
Dr. Healy, Shelly's obstetrician. On December 23rd, Shelly was 
transferred to the University of Utah Hospital for further 
treatment. At University Hospital, Shelly suffered anoxic brain 
damage after a resident physician punctured her heart with a 
biopsy needle, leaving her in a coma, totally and permanently 
disabled. Shelly subsequently died some three and a half years 
later, on May 27, 1992. 
In early 1989, while Shelly was at University Hospital 
in a coma, Dr. Healy discussed Shelly's case with his brother, 
attorney Tim Healy. After this discussion, attorney Healy had 
discussions with the Healys' sister, Diane DeVries. In the 
course of those discussions, attorney Healy asked DeVries to call 
Shelly's family and recommend attorney Roger Sharp, a Salt Lake 
attorney who specialized in medical malpractice cases. DeVries 
had known Shelly's family for some time. DeVries contacted 
Shelly's family but did not tell them that the Healys were her 
brothers, nor did she tell them that she was also Dr. Healy's 
file clerk. Shelly's family retained attorney Roger Sharp on 
February 10, 1989, to represent Shelly in a medical malpractice 
case. Three days later, attorney Healy wrote to attorney Sharp, 
confirming a fee-splitting arrangement. Shelly's family was not 
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aware of attorney Healy's involvement in the case or of Diane 
DeVries' relationship with Dr. Healy and attorney Healy. The 
letter from attorney Healy to attorney Sharp makes clear that 
attorney Healy was communicating with Dr. Healy about attorney 
Sharp's investigation and implies that attorney Sharp's 
investigation of Dr. Healy's treatment was to be minimal. 
As part of his investigation, attorney Sharp sent a 
document request to Dr. Healy, seeking "a copy of all medical 
records regarding [Shelly] Hipwell." Dr. Healy did not produce a 
copy of all medical records, but instead produced a selective set 
of documents that he personally reviewed. Attorney Sharp never 
received a copy of Shelly's complete medical records from 
Dr. Healy. By letter, attorney Sharp also requested a copy of 
Shelly's complete medical records from McKay-Dee Hospital. 
However, he subsequently orally limited that request and 
ultimately received only limited medical records from McKay-Dee. 
On May 6, 1989, attorney Sharp and Shelly's family settled her 
case against University Hospital for $250,000, the amount of the 
previously effective statutory cap on damages against the 
University.1 
In mid-198 9, Shelly was transferred from McKay-Dee 
Hospital, to which she had returned from University Hospital on 
April 14, 1989, to the Greenery, a rehabilitation facility in 
Washington State. Carol Pederson, a social worker at the 
Greenery, contacted attorney Simon Forgette on August 10, 1989, 
to request that he provide an opinion of the settlement in 
Shelly's case and evaluate the conduct of her attorneys in 
settling the case. At that time, Forgette's memos to the file 
regarding the possible new case indicate that Forgette understood 
that Shelly's liver had been lacerated during her caesarian 
delivery at McKay-Dee. On August 29th, Forgette contacted 
Pederson, who assured him that she had the family's permission to 
discuss Shelly's case. She identified Sharp as Shelly's Utah 
attorney. That same day, Pederson wrote a letter to Forgette in 
which she stated, "Ms. Jensen [Shelly's mother] has requested you 
to offer an opinion on the settlement reached in this case, and 
advise the family regarding any further legal action which might 
1
 This court struck down the statutory cap on medical 
malpractice damages as unconstitutional on May 1, 1989, in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), 
approximately five days before Shelly's family agreed to the 
$250,000 settlement offered by the University. Attorney Sharp 
knew of our decision in Condemarin when the settlement was agreed 
to, and his actions in that case have been the subject of 
litigation. See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993). 
3 No- 950164 
be indicated." On September 18th, Forgette reviewed medical 
records provided by Pederson and asked that she arrange for a 
meeting with Ms. Jensen, Shelly's mother. His understanding at 
that time was still that Shelly's liver had been lacerated at 
McKay-Dee. Forgette's memo to his file also indicates that he 
needed to determine "the statute of limitations on bringing any 
claim against hospitals or against attorneys." 
On October 19, 1989, Ms. Jensen, Shelly's mother, 
traveled to Washington and met with Forgette to discuss Shelly's 
case. Ms. Jensen orally retained Forgette on this date and 
Forgette was to request a copy of attorney Sharp's file. 
Forgette's memo to the file at this time indicates that he was 
working with a Utah attorney who was doing some background 
investigations regarding Shelly's case and the settlement with 
University Hospital. This attorney wanted to "remain in the 
background" because he had worked with attorney Sharp in the past 
and received a significant amount of business from McKay-Dee. 
The memo to the file also indicates that, after meeting with 
Shelly's mother, Forgette's understanding was that Shelly's liver 
"had been either damaged or had burst" while she was at McKay-
Dee. On October 20th, Forgette wrote to Sharp requesting a copy 
of his file on Shelly. By December 14th, Ms. Jensen still had 
not signed a formal retainer and Forgette had still not received 
Sharp's file. On that date, Forgette drafted a retainer 
agreement to send to Ms. Jensen, which provided that Forgette was 
to handle claims against McKay-Dee Hospital, University Hospital, 
Roger Sharp, attorney Healy and/or others. On December 26th, 
Forgette received a portion of Sharp's file, but he did not 
receive the entire file until February 15, 1990. In the 
meantime, the present plaintiffs, Ms. Jensen and Shayne Hipwell 
(Shelly's husband), signed Forgette's written retainer agreement 
on January 17, 1990. 
When Forgette received Sharp's file on February 15th, 
he learned of attorney Healy's involvement in the case and 
learned that Sharp's file did not contain a complete set of 
medical records from Dr. Healy or McKay-Dee Hospital. Forgette 
did not file a notice of intent to commence suit in the instant 
case against McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy until almost two 
years later, on December 16, 1991.2 Shelly Hipwell died on 
2
 Section 78-14-8 of the Utah Code provides that a medical 
malpractice action may not commence "unless and until the 
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant . . . at least ninety 
days' prior notice of intent to commence an action." If the 
filing of the notice of intent comes less than 90 days before the 
(Footnote continued on the next page.) 
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May 27, 1992, and Forgette filed the complaint in this suit on 
July 29, 1992. 
After allowing the parties to complete discovery, the 
trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee 
on February 21, 1995, ruling that the two-year statute of 
limitations governing medical malpractice actions contained in 
section 78-14-4 of the Utah Code had run by December of 1991, 
when Forgette filed his notice of intent. On appeal, Shelly's 
family makes a series of arguments, which are summarized below. 
First, Shelly's family contends that the wrongful death 
statute of limitations, section 78-12-28(2) of the Code, applies 
to their wrongful death claims. They argue that their claims 
cannot be barred until two years after Shelly's death because the 
2
 (Footnote continued.) 
end of the limitations period for filing a medical malpractice 
action, the limitation period "shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of notice." Id. Further, within 60 days of 
filing a notice of intent, the plaintiff must submit a request 
for prelitigation panel review. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-12(1) (c) (2) (a) . But see Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 
1131 (Utah 1992) (holding that action may not be dismissed for 
failure to file request for prelitigation review within 60 days 
of notice of intent) . That section also provides that upon 
filing a request for prelitigation review, the statute of 
limitations is tolled until 60 days after the prelitigation panel 
issues its opinion. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3). 
We note that Shelly's family filed its notice of intent on 
December 16, 1991, but did not file its lawsuit until July 29, 
1992, more than 120 days after filing the notice of intent. Both 
parties before this court briefed the issues as if December 16, 
1989, the date two years before the filing of the notice of 
intent, was the relevant date for statute of limitations 
purposes. We can only assume that Shelly's family's failure to 
file its lawsuit within 120 days of that date was due to their 
having filed a request for prelitigation review and waiting for 
the panel's decision. However, we find no indication of this in 
the record. If Shelly's family did not file a prelitigation 
review request, the filing of the lawsuit more than 120 days 
after the filing of the notice of intent may be fatal to the 
entire suit. See Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1981) (holding that where notice of intent was filed less 
than 90 days before running of limitations period and lawsuit was 
not filed within 120 days of filing notice of intent, suit was 
properly dismissed). We do not address this issue because it was 
not presented to us. 
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wrongful death statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
the decedent's death. In the alternative, they argue that if the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations contained in section 
78-14-4 of the Code applies in cases of wrongful death due to 
medical malpractice, the two-year period it contains should not 
begin to run until the decedent's death. We reject both these 
claims. 
Second, Shelly's family asserts that the running of the 
statute of limitations on both Shelly's personal injury claims 
(which survived her death and are now asserted by her family) and 
their wrongful death claims should be tolled because of 
Dr. Healy's alleged fraudulent concealment of the facts upon 
which their claims are grounded. The trial court ruled that 
Shelly's family's oral retention of attorney Forgette on 
October 19, 1989, more than two years before the filing of the 
notice of intent, "demonstrated that Forgette was in possession 
of facts whereby he knew or should have known that [Shelly] 
Hipwell's condition was caused or possibly caused by negligence 
on the part of McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Healy." We conclude 
that this is a disputed issue of fact that precludes summary 
judgment. 
Third, Shelly's family argues that Shelly Hipwell's 
minor children should be allowed to proceed with claims for 
wrongful death because the children's minority tolled the statute 
of limitations as to their claims. Last, Shelly's family argues 
that they should be allowed to proceed on their separate claims 
for common law fraud, which are governed by a three-year statute 
of limitations. We reject both claims. 
Returning in depth to Shelly's family's first argument 
concerning the statute of limitations that applies to their 
wrongful death claims: Shelly's family reasons that because this 
is a claim for wrongful death, section 78-12-28(2) of the Code, 
which governs wrongful death, is the applicable statute of 
limitations, rather than the Medical Malpractice Act statute of 
limitations contained in section 78-14-4, as the trial court 
held. Shelly's family further argues that the two-year limit in 
the wrongful death statute does not begin to run until the 
decedent's death. 
When we are faced with two statutes that purport to 
cover the same subject, we seek to determine the legislature's 
intent as to which applies. In doing this, we follow the general 
rules of statutory construction, which provide both that "the 
best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the 
statute," Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 
1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 
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903, 906 (Utah 1984)), and that "xa more specific statute governs 
instead of a more general statute.'" De Baritault v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1996) (quoting Pan Energy v. 
Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted)). In 
this case, the Medical Malpractice Act's plain language indicates 
a legislative intent to have the statute apply to claims such as 
the ones Shelly's family seeks to bring. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act specifically 
provides, "No malpractice action . . . may be brought unless it 
is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers . . . the injury." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. The Act 
defines "malpractice actions" to which the Act was intended to 
apply as "any action against a health care provider, whether in 
contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, 
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out 
of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." Id. § 78-14-3(14) (emphasis added). 
Clearly, the legislature intended that the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act apply to actions for wrongful death based upon 
personal injuries arising out of medical malpractice. Further, 
this statute is more specific than the general wrongful death 
statute of limitations, applying as it does only to wrongful 
death actions arising out of medical malpractice. Therefore, we 
hold that the two-year statute of limitations governing medical 
malpractice actions covers this action for wrongful death arising 
out of medical malpractice. 
Shelly's family next argues that if the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations governs their claims for 
wrongful death, the event that begins the running of the statute 
is the decedent's death. The medical malpractice statute of 
limitations provides that a medical malpractice action must be 
brought "within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (emphasis 
added). Shelly's family argues that the "injury" in a wrongful 
death case arising out of medical malpractice is not the 
malpractice itself but is, rather, the death. They argue that 
because there can be no cause of action for wrongful death until 
death occurs, the statute of limitations on their claims cannot 
begin to run until Shelly's death. 
We have held that an action for wrongful death is an 
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased, Van 
Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah 1947). This 
is conceptually compatible with Shelly's family's assertion of a 
right to proceed independent of any analysis of Shelly's predeath 
rights against her physicians. However, we have not entirely 
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separated the heirs' right from the decedent's because the heirs' 
right is in major part based on rights of support, both financial 
and emotional, that run to them from the deceased. Accordingly, 
we have held that the wrongful death cause of action is based on 
the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed 
subject to at least some of the defenses that would have been 
available against the decedent had she lived to maintain her own 
action. See, e.g., Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 
1155 (Utah 1989) (comparative negligence). The question here is 
whether we should separate the death from the causative wrong 
sufficiently to permit a wrongful death action where the 
decedent's personal injury cause of action had been barred at the 
time of death. We decline to adopt such a rule. 
As one of the foremost authorities on the law of torts 
has observed, the rationale underlying the rule barring the heirs 
from bringing a wrongful death suit after the injured patient has 
brought suit on the underlying personal injury action is that 
"the injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support 
of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the 
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though 
others may be dependent upon him." W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed. 
1984). The majority of states refuses to allow a decedent's 
heirs to proceed with a wrongful death suit after the decedent 
has settled his or her personal injury case or won or lost a 
judgment before dying. Id. Given the underlying rationale, and 
given that the core purpose of any statute of limitations is to 
compel exercise of a right within a reasonable time to avoid 
stale claims, loss of evidence, and faded memories, Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989), we see no 
reason to impose a different rule regarding the heirs' 
maintenance of a wrongful death suit where an injured patient has 
chosen to let the statute of limitations run on the underlying 
personal injury claim rather than settling or litigating the 
claim. Therefore, we hold that in wrongful death claims arising 
out of medical malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations 
is section 78-14-4 of the Code, and the statute begins to run at 
the time the "patient discovers or, through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs," meaning the time the patient discovers or should have 
discovered the medical malpractice injury. Thus, Shelly's 
family's wrongful death claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations, unless, as we discuss below, the statute was tolled 
for some reason.3 
3
 Shelly's family also argues that they are entitled to 
(Footnote continued on the next page.) 
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Notwithstanding the two-year statute of limitations 
governing their claims. Shelly's family argues that they are 
entitled to maintain these actions because the statute of 
limitations was tolled by Dr. Healy and attorney Healy's fraud 
sufficiently long that attorney Forgette's notice of intent was 
timely. Disposition of this claim requires a rather in-depth 
discussion of the complex law of fraudulent concealment. 
Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal 
duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain silent or 
otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him. 37 Am. 
Jur. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 (1968). Such a duty or obligation 
may arise from a relationship of trust between the parties, an 
inequality of knowledge or power between the parties, or other 
attendant circumstances indicating reliance. Id. The party's 
silence must amount to fraud, i.e., silence under the 
circumstances must amount to an affirmation that a state of 
things exists which does not exist, and the uninformed party must 
be deprived to the same extent as if a positive assertion had 
been made. Id. Such xx [c] oncealment or nondisclosure becomes 
fraudulent only when there is an existing fact or condition . . . 
which the party charged is under a duty to disclose." Id. 
Making use of a device that misleads, some trick or contrivance 
that is intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry, may 
also amount to fraudulent concealment. Id. It is this aspect of 
fraudulent concealment that is at issue in the instant case. 
3
 (Footnote continued.) 
proceed with Shelly's personal injury/medical malpractice claims 
as her personal representatives and/or heirs under the survival 
statutes. The survival statutes provide that a deceased person's 
personal injury action does not abate when that person dies, but 
rather survives the person's death and may be brought by the 
deceased's personal representatives or heirs. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11-12. However, if the person has not brought suit before 
her death, her personal representatives or heirs may bring suit 
only if the person died before the time allowed for bringing suit 
had expired, and then they must bring suit within one year of the 
person's death. See id. § 78-12-37. 
Absent any reason to toll the statute, the two-year statute 
of limitations governing Shelly Hipwell's medical 
malpractice/personal injury claims, section 78-14-4, had run by 
the time she died. If Shelly did not bring suit before the time 
allowed for doing so had expired, her personal injury cause of 
action did not survive her death, and thus her family cannot 
bring a survival claim. 
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Applying the facts of Shelly's case to these 
requirements, Shelly's family's argument must run as follows: 
(i) Dr. Healy was in a position of superior knowledge and was the 
beneficiary of Shelly's and her family's trust; (ii) this 
superior knowledge and position of trust created a duty to 
disclose material facts regarding Shelly's care; (iii) Dr. Healy 
knew of his brother's involvement with attorney Sharp and knew of 
the cursory nature of attorney Sharp's investigation but did not 
disclose these facts to Shelly's family or, alternatively, 
concealed them from Shelly's family to divert attention from his 
alleged malpractice; (iv) Dr. Healy knew that Shelly's family 
would rely on attorney Sharp's investigation to uncover any 
malpractice on his part, thus creating a duty on his part to 
disclose the facts of his association with attorneys Healy and 
Sharp; (v) in this manner, Dr. Healy used his position of 
influence with his brother and attorney Sharp to divert Shelly's 
family's attention away from his care of Shelly, thereby 
preventing them from discovering the facts constituting the 
alleged malpractice. 
Once this argument is reduced to its basic elements, it 
is clear that attorney Sharp's investigation cannot be used to 
start the statute of limitations running against Shelly's 
claims.4 What is not as clear is whether Dr. Healy's alleged 
fraudulent concealment was sufficient to continue tolling the 
statute of limitations once Shelly's family retained attorney 
4
 Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee argue that attorney Sharp's 
investigation of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee Hospital in early 1989 
triggered the statute of limitations as to medical malpractice 
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. We decline to follow 
this logic on the facts as they are presented to us. While under 
general principles of agency law, the knowledge of an agent is to 
be imputed to the principal, it is well established that, where 
the agent has interests in the transaction adverse to the 
principal's, or where the agent colludes with third parties whose 
interests are adverse to the principal's interests, knowledge of 
the facts at issue will not be imputed to the principal. See 3 
Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 290 (1986). In the instant case, attorney 
Sharp's fee-splitting agreement with attorney Healy and the 
implication in attorney Healy's letter to attorney Sharp that 
Sharp's investigation of Dr. Healy's care of Shelly was to be 
minimal indicate that attorney Sharp was, at the least, acting in 
concert with third parties whose interests were adverse to Shelly 
Hipwell's. Therefore, his investigation of Dr. Healy and his 
consideration of Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee as potential defendants 
in a malpractice action cannot be used to start the statute of 
limitations running on Shelly's claims. 
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Forgette in the fall of 1989. As noted above, Shelly's family 
contends that they had no facts that could have led them to 
suspect malpractice by Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee until February of 
1990, when they discovered the relationships among Dr. Healy, 
attorney Healy, Diane DeVries, and attorney Sharp. In contrast, 
Dr. Healy contends that attorney Forgette considered Dr. Healy 
and McKay-Dee as potential defendants in a medical malpractice 
suit on Shelly Hipwell's behalf as early as December 14, 1989, as 
evidenced by his retainer agreement prepared on that date, which 
included references to Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. Shelly's family 
presented attorney Forgette's affidavit as evidence that he 
included Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee in his retainer agreement with 
Shelly's family merely to "cover all the bases" but was retained 
solely to investigate legal malpractice on the part of attorney 
Sharp in settling Shelly's claims against University Hospital for 
her punctured heart. 
The trial court made what amounts to a mixed finding of 
fact and conclusion of law on disputed evidence, to wit, that 
Forgette's "oral retention of October 19, 1989 clearly 
demonstrated that Forgette was in possession of facts whereby he 
knew or should have known that [Shelly] Hipwell's condition was 
caused or possibly caused by negligence on the part of McKay-Dee 
Hospital and Dr. Healy." (Emphasis added.) This finding and 
conclusion is inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." K & T, Inc., 888 P.2d at 626-27 (citing 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235). "xWe determine 
. . . whether the trial court . . . correctly held that there 
were no disputed issues of material fact.'" Id. (quoting Ferree 
v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)). Here, the trial court 
erred. 
The error committed here directly parallels that made 
by the trial court in Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 
1996). In Berenda, we specifically stated: 
The application of this legal rule [of 
fraudulent concealment] to any particular set 
of facts is necessarily a matter left to 
trial courts and finders of fact. . . . [W]e 
explicitly acknowledge that weighing the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in 
light of the defendant's steps to conceal the 
cause of action necessitates the type of 
factual findings which preclude summary 
judgment in all but the clearest of cases. 
Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only 
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when the facts fall on two opposite ends of a 
factual continuum: either (i) when the facts 
are so clear that reasonable persons could 
not disagree about the underlying facts or 
about the application of the governing legal 
standard to the facts or (ii) when the facts 
underlying the allegation of fraudulent 
concealment are so tenuous, vague, or 
insufficiently established that they fail to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
concealment, with the result that the claim 
fails as a matter of law. 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54. In that case, we held that the 
plaintiff's letters to his partner/defendant reflecting the 
plaintiff's suspicion that the partner was misappropriating 
partnership assets were insufficient to underlie a trial court 
finding that the plaintiff was under a duty to make inquiries, 
which would have led to discovery of the cause of action. Id. 
We found that the letter equally supported the plaintiff's 
contention that he voiced his suspicions in the letters in an 
attempt to find out if the company "was really broke." Id. We 
said that "while it may be *a close call,' . . . we cannot agree 
that, as a matter of law, the two letters demonstrate that 
[plaintiff] should have suspected [defendant's] wrongdoing or, 
more importantly, that an inquiry would reasonably have led to 
discovery of the misappropriation." Id. at 55. 
The issue before the trier of fact in this case is 
whether attorney Forgette discovered or reasonably should have 
discovered the legal injury done to Shelly Hipwell before 
December 16, 1989. In other words, the jury must determine 
whether the facts in this case indicate that Dr. Healy's 
fraudulent concealment somehow prevented Shelly's family, who, by 
retaining attorney Forgette, had defeated the collusion of 
Dr. Healy with his brother and attorney Sharp, from inquiring 
into the possibility of medical malpractice on the part of 
Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. The question becomes: Would a 
reasonable attorney, presented with the facts that attorney 
Forgette knew in December of 1989, have considered investigating 
a medical malpractice case against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee? This 
is a genuine issue of material fact, which precludes summary 
judgment in this case. Therefore, we remand to the trial court 
on this issue, the outcome of which will determine whether 
Shelly's family is entitled to proceed on both their survival 
claims and their wrongful death claims. 
Shelly's family's next argument is that even though the 
statute of limitations bars the adult plaintiffs, Shelly's 
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children were minors at the time of her injury and death and, 
therefore, section 78-12-36, the tolling statute, came into play 
and prevented the statute of limitations from running on their 
claims against Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee. 
This argument fails because the children's situation 
does not fit within the tolling statute's terms. Section 
78-12-36 provides, "If a person entitled to bring an action . . . 
is at the time the cause of action accrued, [i] either under the 
age of minority or mentally incompetent and [ii] without a legal 
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-36 (bracketed material added). Shelly's children were 
not entitled to bring an action for wrongful death because Shelly 
had an appointed guardian at the time of her death.5 The 
wrongful death statute provides: 
When the death of a person not a minor is 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his heirs, or his personal 
representatives for the benefit of his heirs, 
may maintain an action for damages against 
the person causing the death . . . . If such 
adult person has a guardian at the time of 
his death, only one action can be maintained 
for the injury to or death of such person, 
and such action may be brought by either the 
personal representatives of such adult 
deceased person, for the benefit of his 
heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of 
the heirs . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 (emphasis added) . The statute thus 
clearly provides that if a guardian has been appointed, only the 
personal representative or guardian may bring suit and the heirs 
are no longer entitled to maintain an action. In this case, 
Shayne Hipwell and Sherry Jensen were appointed as Shelly's 
guardians. Under the statute's plain language, Shelly's children 
were not entitled to bring an action for her wrongful death, and 
the tolling statute becomes irrelevant as the children had no 
claims. 
5
 A separate question we do not address is whether the 
tolling statute would have applied to save the children's 
wrongful death claims even though the statute of limitations had 
run on Shelly's underlying personal injury claims by the time she 
died. 
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As a final argument, Shelly's family seeks to avoid the 
two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations by bringing 
their claim within the three-year fraud statute of limitations. 
During the pendency of the litigation below, Shelly's family 
amended their complaint to allege common law fraud. Shelly' s 
family argues that the statute of limitations for fraud, section 
78-12-26(3), governs these fraud claims, giving them three years 
from the time they discovered the facts constituting the fraud in 
which to bring their action. The trial court ruled that section 
78-14-4(1) (b), the two-year medical malpractice statute of 
limitations, governed Shelly's family's claims for fraud. 
Alternatively, the court held that if the three-year statute 
applies, Shelly's family had established sufficient issues of 
material fact to withstand summary judgment on their fraud 
claims. Shelly's family seeks reversal of the first prong of 
this holding, and Dr. Healy and McKay-Dee seek reversal of the 
second. We uphold the trial court's ruling that the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations governs Shelly's family's 
fraud claims, and we need not reach the second ruling. 
As stated above, when faced with two statutes that 
purport to cover the same subject, our primary duty "is to 
determine legislative intent, and the best evidence of 
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute." 
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879. A settled rule of statutory 
construction, which helps us determine legislative intent, 
provides that "a more specific statute governs instead of a more 
general statute." De Baritault, 913 P.2d at 748 (citation 
omitted). The medical malpractice statute of limitations 
provides a two-year limit on bringing medical malpractice 
actions. The statute includes a discovery rule, providing that 
the two-year limitations period does not begin to run until the 
"patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). In Utah, the discovery rule includes the 
judicially created doctrine of fraudulent concealment. See 
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. The fraudulent concealment doctrine is 
a mechanism whereby a plaintiff "can avoid the full operation of 
the discovery rule by making a prima facie showing of fraudulent 
concealment and then demonstrating that given the defendant's 
actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the 
claim earlier." Id. The medical malpractice statute of 
limitations, with its discovery rule and that rule's fraudulent 
concealment doctrine, applies to every "malpractice action 
against a health care provider." As noted above, the statute 
defines "malpractice action against a health care provider" to 
include actions for wrongful death "based upon alleged personal 
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or 
which should have been rendered by the health care provider." 
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Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-3(14). Thus, the medical malpractice 
act's two-year statute of limitations applies to cases of 
fraudulent concealment arising out of medical malpractice. 
In contrast, the three-year fraud statute of 
limitations, section 78-12-26, applies to any action "for relief 
on the ground of fraud." The fraud statute of limitations is 
thus far broader than the medical malpractice act, and our rules 
of statutory construction provide that the more specific medical 
malpractice act applies instead of the more general fraud statute 
of limitations. 
Shelly's family argues that it has made a general fraud 
claim and a constructive fraud claim in addition to, and distinct 
from, their claims of fraudulent concealment discussed above. 
However, we can find nothing in their allegation of fraud or 
constructive fraud that is in any way different from their claims 
of fraudulent concealment. All the allegations raised by 
Shelly's family surround their claim that Dr. Healy acted to 
divert the family's attention away from his alleged malpractice 
when he had a duty to disclose the facts of his relationship with 
attorneys Healy and Sharp. The only damages arising out of 
Shelly's family's claims for fraud and constructive fraud relate 
to the possibility that they were prevented from discovering the 
facts constituting their claim for medical malpractice. While we 
acknowledge that there may be cases where a doctor commits fraud 
on a patient in a way that would not be covered by the medical 
malpractice act's fraudulent concealment provision, this is not 
such a case. Given the specific facts alleged in this case, we 
cannot agree that Shelly's family's fraud claim amounts to 
anything more than or is different from a claim of fraudulent 
concealment of medical malpractice.6 See Gillman v. Department 
6
 Shelly's family claims that this reading of the statutes 
would violate their right to uniform operation of laws under 
article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. They argue that, 
read as outlined above, the medical malpractice statute creates 
two classes of people, those defrauded by health care providers 
and those defrauded by others, and provides a shorter statute of 
limitations for the former than for the latter. We decline to 
address this issue as it is inadequately researched and briefed. 
See Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996); 
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 234 (Utah 1995); State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. 
v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1079 (Utah 1988); 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
(Footnote continued on the next page.) 
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of Fin, Inst./ 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989) (rejecting 
attempts to recast claim for damages arising out of regulators' 
licensing decision as claim for negligence to avoid governmental 
immunity). 
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's family's wrongful 
death claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations 
for medical malpractice actions contained in section 78-14-4 of 
the Utah Code, We further conclude that the limitations period 
starts running when the patient or plaintiff discovers, or 
through the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the 
underlying injury and its origins in medical malpractice. We 
remand this case for a factual finding as to whether Shelly's 
family's claims of fraudulent concealment will toll the statute 
of limitations as to their wrongful death and survival claims. 
We hold that the deceased's children were not entitled to bring a 
wrongful death claim because their mother had a guardian 
appointed at the time of her death and thus the children were not 
entitled to the provisions of the tolling statute. Finally, we 
hold that Shelly's family's claims for common law fraud are also 
governed by the two-year medical malpractice statute of 
limitations found in section 78-14-4 and decline to reach their 
claims of the unconstitutionality of this reading of the statute. 
Justice Russon, Justice Howe, Judge Eves, and Judge 
Halliday concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
Having disqualified themselves, Associate Chief Justice 
Stewart and Justice Durham do not participate herein; District 
Judge J. Philip Eves and District Judge Bruce K. Halliday sat. 
6
 (Footnote continued.) 
As we recently noted in Monson v. Carver, we may refuse to 
address a claim of unconstitutionality where the party making the 
claim has failed to make the requisite showing to support the 
claim. 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). *MA] reviewing court 
is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" 
Id. (quoting Butler, 909 P.2d at 230-31) (additional citations 
omitted). In this case, as in Monson, we are particularly loath 
to address a claim of unconstitutionality of a statute where the 
outcome would "'critically depend on factual research" into the 
effectiveness of these differing statutes of limitations in 
furthering the legislature's purported goals. 
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REMITTITUR 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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On Petition for Rehearing 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
This court now grants rehearing and issues this opinion 
without hearing oral argument. We address whether we should 
uphold summary judgment in favor of defendant McKay-Dee Hospital 
("McKay-Dee") because plaintiffs Shayne Hipwell and Sherry 
Jensen's wrongful death action against McKay-Dee was barred by 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-4. In our prior opinion in this case, we reversed 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to all defendants 
and remanded on the issue of whether defendant Michael J. Healy's 
(uDr. Healy") alleged fraud in collaborating with plaintiffs' 
original attorney was sufficient to toll the statute of 
limitations on their medical malpractice claims once they had 
retained an independent attorney. Jensen v. IHC Hosps. , Inc. , 
314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29 (Apr. 4, 1997). We further held that 
Jensen and Hipwell's attempt to recharacterize their medical 
malpractice wrongful death claim as a claim for fraud was not 
sufficient to avoid the two-year medical malpractice statute of 
limitations. Id. at 30. In its petition for rehearing, McKay-
Dee now claims that summary judgment in its favor should have 
been upheld because (i) Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the 
statute of limitations as to Jensen and Hipwell's claims against 
McKay-Dee; and (ii) Jensen and Hipwell's allegations of fraud on 
the part of McKay-Dee were properly dismissed by the trial court. 
We begin with a brief review of the facts relevant to 
our decision on rehearing. Because we are reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving parties, Jensen and Hipwell. Id. at 25. Jensen 
and Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy, who had staff privileges at 
McKay-Dee but was not employed by McKay-Dee, committed 
malpractice on Shelly Hipwell (Jensen's daughter and Hipwell's 
wife) while she was a patient at McKay-Dee. They claim that, to 
cover his alleged malpractice, he and a McKay-Dee doctor 
fraudulently transferred Shelly to University Hospital. Jensen 
and Hipwell further allege that Dr. Healy then colluded with his 
brother, attorney Tim Healy, and attorney Roger Sharp to prevent 
Jensen and Hipwell from learning of the malpractice Dr. Healy had 
allegedly committed. Jensen and Hipwell made no allegation that 
McKay-Dee knew about Dr. Healy's collusion with his brother and 
attorney Sharp. 
In our prior opinion, we held that Jensen and Hipwell's 
allegations of fraud against Dr. Healy were sufficient to toll 
the statute of limitations on their claims as long as they 
retained attorney Sharp. Id. at 28. However, we remanded to the 
trial court on the issue of whether Dr. Healy's alleged fraud was 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations after Jensen and 
Hipwell retained independent counsel but before that counsel had 
actual knowledge of the facts constituting Dr. Healy's alleged 
fraud. Id. at 2 8-29. The issues we now address are (i) whether 
Dr. Healy's alleged fraud can also act to toll the statute of 
limitations as to McKay-Dee; and (ii) whether Jensen and 
Hipwell's allegations of fraud on the part of McKay-Dee are 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee. 
These issues were not discussed in our initial opinion. 
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As to the first issue, whether Dr. Healy's fraudulent 
collusion with Jensen and Hipwell's original attorney can toll 
the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee, the general rule is 
that fraud committed by a third party in concealing a cause of 
action against another defendant will not toll the statute of 
limitations as to that defendant. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions § 150 (1970) . Where, however, there is an agency or 
privity relationship between the third party committing the fraud 
and the defendant, our cases indicate that liability for the 
agent's negligent or intentional tort can be imputed to the 
principal if the agent acts in whole or in part to carry out the 
purposes of the principal. See Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 
P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 
1053, 1057 (Utah 1989) .x On the record before us, we cannot 
determine whether Dr. Healy's fraud in colluding with attorney 
Sharp and attorney Healy should be imputed to McKay-Dee absent 
two factual findings: (i) that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's agent; 
and (ii) that Dr. Healy acted in whole or in part to further the 
aims of McKay-Dee. The complaint makes no allegations regarding 
these issues. We remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
If the trial court finds that Dr. Healy was McKay-Dee's 
agent and that he acted at least in part to further McKay-Dee's 
aims, it should impute liability for Dr. Healy's fraud to McKay-
Dee and toll the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee to the 
same extent it is tolled as to Dr. Healy.2 If, on the other 
hand, the trial court finds either that Dr. Healy was not McKay-
Dee's agent or that Dr. Healy acted "entirely on personal motives 
unrelated to [McKay-Dee's] interests," Hodges, 811 P.2d at 157, 
then Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the statute of limitations 
1
 The cases cited also include two other factors to consider 
in determining whether an agent's conduct will be imputed to the 
principal in the employment context: (i) whether the employee's 
conduct is of the general kind the employee is expected to 
perform; and (ii) whether the employee's conduct occurred within 
the hours of the employee's work and ordinary spatial boundaries. 
Hodges. 811 P.2d at 156; Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1056-57. As 
Dr. Healy was not McKay-Dee's employee, these criteria would not 
seem to apply to the question of whether Dr. Healy's acts fall 
within the scope of any agency relationship he may have had with 
McKay-Dee. 
2
 We note, however, that this issue will be moot if the fact 
finder determines, pursuant to our prior opinion, that Jensen and 
Hipwell's complaint was not timely filed because Dr. Healy's 
fraud did not toll the statute of limitations long enough. See 
Jensen, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. 
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as to McKay-Dee and Jensen and Hipwell's claims against McKay-Dee 
are barred. 
Moving to the second issue raised on rehearing, Jensen 
and Hipwell argue that the statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee 
should be tolled because of fraud allegedly committed by McKay-
Dee, through one of its doctors, in participating in an allegedly 
fraudulent transfer of Shelly Hipwell from McKay-Dee to 
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell did not originally argue 
that McKay-Dee had committed fraud that would toll the statute of 
limitations. Their complaint did, however, include a count of 
constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. The trial court held first 
that the medical malpractice statute of limitations, section 
78-14-4 of the Code, barred Jensen and Hipwell's claim of 
constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. In the alternative, the 
trial court ruled that the claim was "unsupported by the facts" 
and that there was "insufficient evidence to submit this matter 
to a jury as the fact finder." In our original opinion, we 
upheld the trial court's finding that Jensen and Hipwell's claim 
for constructive fraud amounted to nothing more than a claim for 
medical malpractice, which would be barred by the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. Jensen, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 30. We did not address, however, the contention that Jensen 
and Hipwell's allegations of constructive fraud on the part of 
McKay-Dee would be sufficient to toll the statute of limitations 
on Jensen and Hipwell's medical malpractice claims against McKay-
Dee. We find that the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment to McKay-Dee, ruling that Jensen and Hipwell's 
constructive fraud claim was insufficiently supported by the 
evidence and therefore could not be used to toll the statute of 
limitations. 
Addressing the merits of this claim requires a careful 
analysis of the relative burdens of proof and production involved 
in making and opposing a motion for summary judgment. As noted 
above, when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we view all 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 
25. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the 
burden of proof for its motion, namely, the burden of proving 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
However, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff 
still has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his 
or her cause of action. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 
P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994) . Further, once challenged, the party 
who opposes such a motion must come forward with sufficient proof 
to support his or her claim, particularly when that party has had 
an opportunity to conduct discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) . The party opposing a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment umay not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his [or her] pleading, but his [or her] 
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response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Put 
another way, once the moving party has brought forth evidence 
either tending to prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact 
or challenging the existence of one of the elements of the cause 
of action, the nonmoving party then bears the burden of 
uprovid[ing] some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support 
of the essential elements of his [or her] claim." Thayne, 874 
P.2d at 124. 
In this case, Jensen and Hipwell failed to provide any 
such evidence to support their claim of constructive fraud. 
Constructive fraud requires two elements: (i) a confidential 
relationship between the parties; and (ii) a failure to disclose 
material facts. See Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301-02 
(Utah 1978); 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§ 4, 15 (1968). 
Jensen and Hipwell's complaint alleges both (i) that McKay-Dee's 
employee, Dr. Baughman, had a confidential relationship with 
Shelly and her family as one of her treating physicians, and 
(ii) that Dr. Baughman failed to disclose that he had committed 
medical malpractice in treating Shelly. McKay-Dee's motion for 
summary judgment did not challenge Jensen and Hipwell's assertion 
that Dr. Baughman had a confidential relationship with Shelly and 
her family. McKay-Dee's motion, however, did dispute Jensen and 
Hipwell's allegation that Dr. Baughman failed to disclose his 
alleged malpractice. McKay-Dee produced the deposition of 
Dr. Baughman, wherein he states, UI have no question at all that 
[Shelly] received care that's exemplary, that could be used as an 
example of the management of a good operation." Dr. Baughman 
further indicated that he held that belief at the time he 
provided Shelly's care. McKay-Dee properly challenged Jensen and 
Hipwell's allegation that Dr. Baughman had failed to discharge 
his duty to disclose material facts to them, namely, the fact 
that he had committed malpractice, by producing Dr. Baughman's 
deposition in which he states that he did not believe and does 
not believe that he committed malpractice. 
Jensen and Hipwell, however, as the nonmoving parties, 
utterly failed to meet their burden of coming forward with 
evidence to contradict Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony. In 
their opposition to McKay-Dee's motion for summary judgment, 
Jensen and Hipwell simply reiterate the allegations of their 
complaint and provide no support for their claim that 
Dr. Baughman failed to tell them that Shelly had been "left to 
bleed internally for several hours before accurately diagnosing 
her illness." Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony specifically 
and directly challenges Jensen and Hipwell's assertion, and they 
failed to provide any evidence to support their claim. Thus, the 
trial court correctly ruled that there was insufficient evidence 
to submit the matter to a jury. Because Jensen and Hipwell's 
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claim of constructive fraud against McKay-Dee was insufficiently 
supported by the evidence, such a claim cannot be used to toll 
the statute of limitations on their medical malpractice claims 
against McKay-Dee. 
We remand to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Justice Howe, Justice Russon, Judge Eves, and Judge 
Halliday concur in Chief Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
Having disqualified themselves, Associate Chief Justice 
Stewart and Justice Durham do not participate herein; District 
Judge J. Philip Eves and District Judge Bruce K. Halliday sat. 
No. 950164 6 
